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The past fifteen years have been a difficult period for the beef industry. Industry 
participants have witnessed the gradual erosion of their market share due to increased 
competitive pressure from poultry and pork. In 1980, per capita beef consumption was 
just over 75 pounds. By 1994, that figure had dropped to only 63 pounds (United States 
Department of Agriculture). The inability of the beef industry to respond effectively to 
these competitive pressures may be attributed to a number of different problems. A brief 
list of these problems might include product inc~msistency, imprecise or inadequate 
quality standards, the public's perception of red meat as unhealthy, poor coordination of 
the efforts of producers at different market levels, and the often-hostile relationship 
between cattle feeders and meatpackers (Schroeder et al.). Solutions to problems such as 
product inconsistency and a poor grading system must rely primarily on technical 
advances to aid in the production and evaluation of meat products; however, some of the 
critical issues facing the beef industry are primarily economic in nature. Economic 
research thus provides the most appropriate means of understanding and resolving these 
problems. This dissertation deals with three important issues faced by the beef industry: 
• the proper application of information about com and feeder cattle prices when 
making production/marketing decisions, 
• the role and importance of market information in price discovery, and 
• the potential economic benefits of non-price vertical coordination. 
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In terms of relevant economic theory, these problems may be broadly considered 
as management, policy, and marketing issues. However, in a more applied context, these 
problems relate primarily to the efficiency ( or lack thereof) of both production and 
exchange in the cattle industry. The following three articles present the results of 
research on each of these issues. A brief outline of each article follows. 
The Feeder Cattle/Corn Price Relationship 
The first article, "The Dynamics of Feeder Cattle Market Response to Corn Price 
Change," studies the relationship between prices of the two most important inputs to 
cattle feeding: corn and feeder calves. The objective of this study is to provide a more 
complete understanding of the com/feeder cattle price relationship than is currently 
embodied in common rules-of-thumb derived from linear econometric models or break-
even budgets. To accomplish this objective, a recursive system of equations is developed 
which describes how cattle placement weights and slaughter weights as well as feeder 
cattle prices respond to a change in corn prices. This research will thus allow cattle 
producers to respond more appropriately to corn price changes, resulting in more 
efficient allocation of the resources used in beef production. Dynamic simulation of the 
system reveals how these adjustments take place over time. 
The unique feature of this research is that it presents a feeder calf pricing model 
based directly upon a break-even budget calculation of feeder price. Consequently, the 
model includes technical parameters related to the feeding process (i.e., placement 
weight, slaughter weight, and feed conversion rate) which must be considered in 
budgeting. Previous econometric studies have not included this type of information 
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(Buccola; Rucker, Burt, and Lafrance). They have thus not been able to provide a 
complete explanation of how production practices, as well as feeder cattle prices, adjust 
in response to com price changes. 
Public Information and Price Discovery 
The second article, "Experimental Simulation of Public Information Impacts on Price 
Discovery and Marketing Efficiency in the Fed Cattle Market," examines an important 
public policy issue related to the cattle feeding industry. The objective of this study is to 
provide important information to policymakers who must decide the fate of government 
price reporting programs in the face of shrinking budgets for such programs. This study 
uses data from the Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) to determine the economic 
effects of a reduction in the amount ofpublicly provided price and quantity information 
available to fed cattle market participants. This study examines the effects of 
information reductions on the level and variability of prices as well as on the ability of 
FCMS participants to efficiently produce and market fed cattle. 
This study is unique in two respects. First, the data used in this study were 
obtained from a controlled experiment with the FCMS. Such experiments are rare in the 
economics literature. Moreover, the study specifically examines the effects of public 
price and quantity information on a cash market. Most previous studies on the value of 
public information have focused instead upon the impact of government production or 
inventory reports on commodity futures markets. (For examples of these studies, see 
Colling and Irwin and Grunewald, McNulty, and Biere.) Results ofthis study indicate 
3 
that reducing the amount of publicly provided information in the fed cattle market will 
increase price variability and decrease the efficiency of production and marketing. 
Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle Market 
The third article, "Estimated Value of Non-Price Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle 
Market," examines the issue of cooperation in marketing between feedlots and 
meatpackers. The study's objective is to determine the value-in terms of increased 
industry-level profits--of coordinated marketing/purchasing of fed cattle by feedlots and 
packing plants. Like the information impact study just described, this study also uses 
data obtained from the FCMS. In this study, the industry-level profits achieved by FCMS 
participants whose marketings were coordinated only by the price system are compared 
with the profits which could have been achieved by employing various non-price 
coordination strategies. Analysis of these industry-level profits reveals whether gains to 
vertical coordination result from increased revenue or from cost reductions for either 
feeders or packers. The comparisons made in the study are accomplished using 
simulation techniques. This study is unique in that it quantifies the gains from vertical 
coordination. Much literature exits on the subject of vertical coordination; however, this 
extensive literature deals almost exclusively with the theoretical incentives for vertical 
coordination (Den Ouden, et al). As a quantitative study of vertical coordination's 
effects, this study represents an important addition to the literature. Results of this study 
indicate that the potential gains in industry-level profit due to the adoption of non-price 
coordination strategies are significant in the fed cattle market. 
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Chapter Structure 
The following three chapters present each of the above summarized articles in their 
entirety. Each of these chapters is written in the style of a journal article ( with the 
exception that all references have been combined into a single reference list). Consistent 
with the format for journal article submissions, all tables and figures are placed at the end 
of each chapter. The format of a journal article does not allow for a great deal of 
elaboration on issues not directly addressed in the article's stated objectives, even if these 
issues are related to the main topic of the article. For this reason, a number of appendices 
have been attached to this dissertation. These appendices provide additional detail and 
further research results related to the findings presented in Chapters II through N. The 
final chapter briefly summarizes the major conclusions of each article and offers selected 
suggestions for future research. · 
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Chapter II 
The Dynamics of Feeder Cattle Market Response to Corn Price Change 
One of the more useful firm-level management tools available to cattle feeders is 
break-even budgeting. Simple budgeting exercises allow feeders to estimate the profit 
potential of a pen of cattle, to determine the price which they can afford to pay for feeder 
cattle, or to evaluate the effect on their bottom line of a change in cattle and/or feed 
prices. 
The use of break-even budgeting analysis has frequently been extended by 
agricultural economists and others to describe and forecast feeder cattle market reactions 
to various exogenous shocks. There would appear to be inherent potential dangers in 
using what is essentially a comparative static micro-level tool as a macro/market-level 
analysis tool. One potential danger or weakness is that break-even budgeting analysis 
appears to ignore the dynamics of the cattle industry. A second danger is that break-even 
analysis assumes perfectly competitive market responses to all exogenous shocks. 
This study will first describe the general methodology used in making market-
level forecasts using break-even budgeting analysis. It will then summarize the general 
conclusions reported from such analyses about the nature of the feeder cattle market. 
Specific emphasis will be given to summarizing the implications economists have made 
and published in the last few years about the impact of com price changes on feeder 
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cattle prices. The number of popular press and professional articles on this subject is 
quite large over the past few years given recent record high com prices. Following this 
review, a dynamic framework for modeling feeder cattle price will draw upon the sound 
theoretical postulates of break-even analysis as well as other previous econometric 
studies of the feeder cattle market. In so doing it will attempt to correct the 
aforementioned perceived weaknesses of break-even analysis with regard to market 
dynamics and the assumption of perfectly competitive market behavior. Results of this 
study suggest that estimates of the impact of com price changes on feeder cattle price 
made with break-even analysis significantly underestimate the impact of com price 
changes on feeder cattle prices. The cause( s) of this underestimation are explored and 
the considerations needed to alleviate it are postulated. 
Review of Break-even Analysis Methods and Results 
The use of break-even budgets by cattle feeders is justified by economic theory, which 
maintains that the price of an input will depend to a large degree upon output price and 
transformation costs. With respect to cattle markets, this suggests that feeder calf prices 
will be closely related to fed cattle and com prices. The relationship among prices for 
these commodities can be illustrated with break-even budget calculations. Assume that 
the price of com is $2.50/bu and that the price of 1,200 pound fed steers is $74/cwt. 
Given a feed conversion rate of 7 pounds of feed to one pound of beef gain, a cattle 
feeder can estimate a break-even price for 750 pound feeder steers by the method 
illustrated in table 2.1. 
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Particular attention is often focused on the impact of com price on feeder calf 
. prices. Given the importance of com in the feeding process, this focus is warranted. 
Generally, in commercial feedlots well over two-thirds of the cost of feed can be 
attributed to grain costs (USDA). The vast majority of this grain is com. Com accounts 
for over 80% of all feed grains consumed by U. S. livestock (Ash). Albright, Schroeder, 
and Langemeier examined cost of gain in two Kansas feedlots and determined that over 
60% of the variability in cost of gain could be attributed to com price variability. More 
recently, Langemeier, Schroeder, and Mintert found that changes in com price account 
for 22% of the variability in the profits to cattle feeding. Clearly, there is great incentive 
to investigate the relationship between com and feeder calf prices. 
Various guidelines which attempt to describe the relationship between com and 
feeder calf prices can be found in the popular press. In discussing this relationship, the 
popular press typically uses the term "com price multiplier" which is defined as the ratio 
of the long-term change in feeder calf prices to a change in·the price of com. Fox reports 
that a $1/bu increase in the price of com results in a $7 - $10 decrease in the value of 
calves and feeder cattle. Similarly, Maday writes that a $0.10/bu increase in com price 
will result in a $0.75/cwt drop in feeder prices. Results such as these can be obtained 
from the break-even budget of table 2.1. Given the budget parameters in table 2.1, a one 
dollar increase in the com price drops the break-even feeder price by $7.50/cwt. 
The fundamental problem with deriving estimates of a com price multiplier from 
break-even budgets is that the budgets assume independence of corn prices and the 
technical feeding parameters: placement weight, slaughter weight, and feed conversion 
rate. In other words, to derive a multiplier value, these factors are held constant 
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regardless of the com price. There are two important reasons to believe that this is not a 
valid assumption. First, at high com prices other grains (e.g., wheat) may be used in 
rations. This, in tum, may affect feed conversion. Second, placement and slaughter 
weights will be adjusted in response to com price changes. As com prices increase, more 
weight will be put on calves with forages, leading to higher placement weights (Parsons). 
Cattle may also be sold earlier than usual, leading to lower slaughter weights. These 
weight changes also affect feed conversion rates. Examination of the break-even budget 
in table 2.1 shows that variability in these technical feeding factors will have an impact 
on the relationship between com and break-even feeder prices. In general, we would 
anticipate a high degree of correlation between observed feeder cattle prices and these 
break-even estimates. 
The objective of this research is to provide a more complete understanding of the 
relationship between com and feeder calf prices than is currently reflected in popular 
com price multipliers based on ceteris paribus break-even budgets. This understanding 
should allow cattle producers and feeders to respond more appropriately to com price 
changes with respect to both production and pricing decisions. Furthermore, a better 
understanding of how technical feeding parameters (placement weight, slaughter weight, 
and feed conversion) are affected by com price changes will allow producers to use 
budgeting more effectively as a management/decision making tool. 
Theory and Background 
The basic budget calculation giving profit per head (IT) from feeding cattle can be 
written as follows: 
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(1) II= [(FED• SW)(l - DL)] - [(FC •PW)+ (SW - PW)COG], 
where FED is the price received for fed cattle; SW is the slaughter weight of fed cattle; 
DL is death loss as a percentage of the number of cattle fed; FC is the price paid for 
feeder cattle at placement; PW is the placement weight of feeder cattle; and COG is cost 
of gain per pound. The break-even feeder calf price can be determined from ( 1) by 
assuming that II= 0 and then solving for FC. The result is equation (2) below: 
(2) FC =[((FED• SW) I PW)(l - DL)] - [((SW-PW)COG) I PWJ. 
Com price does not explicitly appear in either of the above equations; however, 
com price is an important element in cost of gain (COG). To see how com price 
multipliers are derived from break-even budgets, note that 
(3) COG= RC• CONV, 
where RC is ration cost/pound; and CONV is the feed conversion rate (lbs feed/lb beef 
gain). 
Because com is such an important ingredient in feedlot rations, the price of com 
is often used as a proxy for ration cost. By replacing ration cost with com price in the 
cost of gain relationship (3) and substituting that new equation into the break-even 
calculation of (2), the relationship between com price and the break-even feeder calf 
price is explicitly established: 
(4) FC =[((FED• SW) I PW)(l-DL)] - [((SW-PW)CONV • CORN) I PWJ, 
where CORN is the price per bushel of com, and all other variables are as previously 
defined. 
In econometric estimation, as in budgeting, com price has often been used as a 
proxy for ration cost. Brester and Marsh modeled the feeder sector as one component of 
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the entire beef industry. Their model of the feeder sector consisted of equations to 
estimate feeder cattle inventories, feeder placement demand, and feeder placement 
supply. Ih that model, the quantity of feeder cattle placed on feed is given as a function 
of feeder calf prices and a slaughter steer/com price ratio. 
Rucker, Burt, and Lafrance also used the beef/com price ratio in generating an 
econometric model of cattle inventory for the state of Montana and for the entire United 
States. As part of their research, the authors estimated an equation to model feeder cattle 
price as a function of the beef/com price ratio. They concluded that the ratio provided 
information on feeder cattle prices that is not contained in current and lagged calf prices 
alone. 
In his analysis of feeder cattle price differentials, Bucco la also estimates a feeder 
calf price model. Rather than using a beef/com price ratio, his model employs corn 
prices and live cattle futures prices. Buccola also included the annual change in all cattle 
inventory and the Palmer Drought Severity Index in his model. 
Feeder Calf Price Model Specification 
The plan of this research was to estimate an econometric model derived directly from the 
break-even equation and to compare the results of that model with those of the linear 
feeder calf price model specified by Buccola. The following equation provides a starting 
point for the break-even model: 
(4') FC1 = [((FEDe1+r • SiY\+r) I PW,t\)(1-DLet+r)] -
[((SW'\+r- PW1)CONV'\+r • CORM) I PW1], 
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where FC is the feeder cattle break-even price at time t; FED is the expected fed cattle 
price for t+f at time t, with f representing the length of the feeding period; SW is expected 
slaughter weight at t+f; PW is the expected weight of cattle placed at t; DL is the 
expected death loss for cattle slaughtered at t+f; CONV is the expected dry matter feed 
conversion rate of cattle slaughtered at t+f; and CORN is the per bushel com price at t. 
The multiplicative relationships that exist between the variables in ( 4') indicate 
that a model with strictly linear relationships between com price, live cattle futures price, 
and feeder cattle price is not the most appropriate representation of the feeder cattle 
market. A more appropriate model would be one using the expected cost and revenue 
components of the break-even feeder cattle price equation as variables. The right-hand 
side of equation ( 4 ') can be broken into expected revenue (REJr) and expected cost 
( COS'r) components as follows: 
(5) REfrt+r= ((FEDet+r• SW\+r) I PW\)(I -DLet+r), and 
(6) . COS'rt+r= ((SW\+r-PT-fl\)COWt+r• CORNt) I PW\ 
From (5) and (6) it is clear that factors other than com and expected fed cattle 
prices influence feeder calf prices. Changes in cattle weights, feed conversion, and death 
loss1 will clearly have some impact on the break-even feeder price. The problem with 
including these factors in a price model is that data on them is not readily available. 
Technical information about cattle in feedlots is only available from individual feedlots. 
Obtaining enough of this private information to create a reliable data set would be 
difficult if not impossible for a researcher. 
Professional Cattle Consultants (PCC) of Weatherford, Oklahoma is a consulting 
firm that compiles performance information from approximately one hundred major 
12 
feedlots throughout the dominant cattle feeding areas of the United States. The feedlots 
reporting to PCC collectively produce over 25% of the fed cattle in the United States. 
While individual feedlot data is confidential, aggregate monthly data for placement 
weights2, slaughter weights, feed conversion rates, and death loss were available for use 
in this research (PCC Newsletter). These data were used to develop models to obtain 
expected values for the technical parameters specified in equations (5) and (6). 
Placement weight is treated as an endogenous variable in this model. At the time 
cattle are placed on feed, the buyer/owner has a choice of what weight of cattle to 
buy/place on feed, thus placement weight is subject to variation due to economic 
conditions. Using monthly PCC data, an econometric model for expected placement 
weight was developed. Of particular interest in this study is the effect of com price upon 
placement weight. Thus placement weight was specified as a function of the com/live 
cattle price ratio, a trend variable, and sin/cosine seasonality variables. The estimated 
equation is given below with standard errors in parentheses: 
(7) PWi = 270.34 + 0.613 PWi_1 + 316.82(C/LC)t + 0.078TIME + 6.458SJN12 + 
(51.07) (0.071) (187.0) (0.029) (2.184) 
7.446SJN6-17.430COS12-6.728COS6; 
(1.403) (2.210) (1.403) 
R2 = 0.8902 and F statistic = 136.628, 
where PW is placement weight at t; Cf LC is com price at t + live cattle futures price at t; 
TIME is a trend variable; SJNJ 2 and SJN6 are sine variables with 12 and 6 month cycles 
respectively; and COSJ 2 and COS6 are cosine variables with 12 and 6 month cycles 
respectively. These sine and cosine variables are included to capture the seasonal 
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behavior of placement weights. As expected, a positive relationship was found between 
placement weight and com price. 
Slaughter weight expectations are derived from a similar partial adjustment 
model. Slaughter weight is modeled as a function of placement weight, a time trend 
variable, and sine/cosine seasonality variables identical to those of the placement weight 
expectation model. The estimated equation is given below with standard errors in 
parentheses: 
(8) SWt+r= 109.97 + 0.794SWt+r-i + 0.165PWi + 0.144TJME- 13.393S1N12 + 
(62.970) (0.049) (0.064) (0.045) (1.447) 
2.448S1N6- 11.363COS12 + 6.165COS6; 
(1.304) (2.507) (1.163) 
R2 = 0.9568 and F statistic= 373.447, 
where SW is the slaughter weight at t+f; and PW is the placement weight of those cattle 
at t. Joint conditional means and joint conditional variance tests of both of these models 
revealed no significant problems with either autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity 
(McGuirk, Driscoll, and Alwang). It should be noted in equation (8) that slaughter 
weight increases with placement weight. This is consistent with the biological nature of 
cattle feeding and with the habits of some cattle feeders. A certain amount of gain must 
come from grain feeding if cattle are to grade choice, and some cattle feeders will feed 
for the same number of days under almost any circumstances. For this reason, higher 
placement weights generally result in higher slaughter weights and vice versa; however, 
sufficient latitude exists within the placement weight/slaughter weight relationship to 
allow significant adjustment to be made and the majority of cattle still grade choice. 
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An attempt was made to estimate feed conversion as a function of placement and 
slaughter weights and seasonality; however, in a partial adjustment specification of the 
model, these explanatory variables were not significant. In a full adjustment model, 
severe autocorrelation was a problem. Since it was not possible to estimate an 
acceptable model of feed conversion rates, monthly average feed conversion figures were 
calculated for the entire 10-year period of the study. These monthly average values were 
used in computing the cost and revenue variables of the break-even equation. 
An actual death loss series was not used in generating the revenue variable. The 
only death loss figure available for the entire period of the study was average death loss 
per month. A more appropriate figure would have been average death loss per pen of 
cattle over the feeding period of the pen. Since this was not available, an average death 
loss per pen of O. 87 percent was used rather than an actual death loss data series. This 
value corresponds to the average death loss per pen in 1994 and 1995, the two years for 
which these data are available. 
Prices used in addition to the technical data obtained from PCC included com 
prices, feeder cattle prices, and live cattle futures prices. The com price used was 
Thursday's average of the price received by farmers for com delivered in Omaha, NE. 
The futures prices used were CME live cattle closing prices. Thursday closes were used 
rather than a weekly average in order to maintain consistency with the cash market 
prices, which were each one day's price rather than a weekly average price. If a holiday 
fell on Thursday, Wednesday's close was substituted. Table 2.2 gives a description of 
the data used in this study. 
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For this study, calves are assumed to be on feed 140 days. Thus, the feeder calf 
price was estimated as a function of the same week's com price and the live cattle futures 
price 140 days forward. Live cattle prices were the futures price that producers would 
most likely use to hedge their cattle. For example, if the expected finish date was in 
May, prices were taken from the June live cattle contract. If the expected finish date was 
in June, prices were taken from the August contract because hedgers would not be 
inclined to take a position that they would need to maintain into the contract expiration 
month. 
Because the model specified here specifically allows for placement weights to 
change over time, this fact must be recognized in the collection and specification of an 
appropriate feeder cattle price series. Feeder cattle prices are reported as the average 
price received over specified weight ranges. To use a price series from just one weight 
range would reflect the general rise and fall of feeder cattle prices over time, but would 
not allow for price changes due to changes in the weight of feeder cattle being placed on 
feed. In general, a strong negative relationship exists between feeder cattle prices per 
hundredweight and the weight of feeder cattle; that is, as feeder cattle weights increase, 
the price per hundredweight declines. Over the time period considered in this study, the 
price for 700-800 pound feeder cattle averaged $3.24/cwt less than the price for 600-700 
pound feeder cattle. 
To address the problem of changing feeder cattle prices with weight, a "weight-
continuous" series of feeder cattle prices was developed by linearly interpolating between 
the discrete weight point prices given by the reporting of average prices received over a 
given weight range. From 1985 to 1991, average prices for 600-700 pound feeder cattle 
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and for 700-800 pound feeder cattle were reported. If it is assumed that the average price 
for 600-700 pound feeders most accurately represents the price for a 650 pound animal 
and that the average price for 700-800 pound feeders represents the price for a 750 pound 
animal, then the price for any weight between 650 and 750 pounds can be imputed by 
linear interpolation. For example, if the price of 600-700 pound steers was $82/cwt, and 
the price for 700-800 pound steers was $80/cwt, the following prices by weight would be 
deduced from linearinterpolation: 650 pounds-$82.00; 675 pounds-$81.50; 700 pounds-
$81.00; 725 pounds-$80.50; 750 pounds-$80.00. Equation (9) expresses this process 
algebraically: 
(9) AFC= FC67 - [((PW - 650)/100)(FC67 - FC78)], 
where AFC is the derived weight-continuous "adjusted feeder price" value; PW is 
placement weight; FC67 is the reported average price for 600-700 pound feeder steers; 
and FC78 is the reported average price for 700-800 pound feeder steers. After 1991 
feeder cattle prices began to be reported for 50 pound weight increments instead of 100 
pound increments. The same basic procedure was used in adjusting these prices except 
one first had to determine which weight range was appropriate and then interpolate in the 
same manner as done in equation (9) but over a 50 pound weight range instead of a 100 
pound weight range. Appendix A explores the possibility that the change in price 
reporting practices beginning in 1992 might bias the parameters of the model. 
Having defined equations (5) through (9), we can return to equation (4') and 
complete the specification of the feeder cattle price model to be estimated ( see equation 
(10) below). Equation (4') contains a revenue and cost component. A positive sign is 
expected on the revenue component, and a negative sign is expected on the cost 
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component. The effect of com prices enters directly into the cost component as is shown 
in (4') as well as (6). Com price also affects the revenue component of (4'), but the 
effect is indirect through placement weight (PW) and slaughter weight (SW) variables. 
Equation (7) for placement weight includes com price as a variable, and, in tum, 
equation (8) for slaughter weight contains placement weight as a variable. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the relationship between variables and equations used in arriving at the break-
even model specified in equation (10). 
Following Buccola's arguments, a cattle on feed variable was included in the 
estimation to help explain the effect of changes in cattle inventory on feeder calf prices. 
The variable was calculated by subtracting the number of cattle on feed one year ago 
from the current number of cattle on feed. The objective of calculating the change 
variable in this manner was to isolate the longer-term annual effect of inventory changes 
rather than the short-term seasonal effect that a monthly change variable would have 
reflected. A positive sign was anticipated since higher numbers of cattle being placed on 
feed would signal a greater demand for feeder cattle. A pair of sine/cosine cyclical 
variables was also used to account for the long-term cattle cycle. These variables were 
specified assuming an eleven-year cycle. Thus, the feeder cattle price equation specified 
for estimation is as follows: 
(10) AFCt = f(AFCt-l, COSTt, RE"Vt, DCOF, D2, ... , DJ 2, COS, SIN), 
where AFC is the adjusted feeder cattle price; COST is feeding cost as defined in 
equation (6); REV is feeding revenue as defined in equation (5); DCOF is a variable 
measuring the change in the number of cattle on feed; D2, ... , DJ 2 is a set of monthly 
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seasonal dummy variables; COS is a cosine variable for an eleven year cattle cycle; and 
SIN is a sine variable for an eleven year cattle cycle. 
Break-even Feeder Calf Price Model Results 
Results of the feeder calf price model are presented in table 2.3. Misspecification tests 
suggested by McGuirk, Driscoll, and Alwang indicated that the break-even model 
displayed no significant statistical problems. A joint conditional means test indicated no 
significant nonlinearity or autocorrelation. A joint conditional variance test indicated no 
significant heteroskedasticity. In addition, Chow tests at January 1991 and at January 
' 
1992 were not significant at the 1 % level, indicating that model stability was acceptable. 
A Chow test was performed at January 1992 because, as noted, feeder calf price 
reporting practices were changed at that date. A test was also conducted at January 1991 
to determine whether or not cyclical effects would lead to parameter instability. That 
date closely corresponds to the peak of the cattle cycle. 
One problem with the model was noted, however. Non-normal distribution of the 
errors was indicated by the Jarque-Bera statistic and by an omnibus test. Using robust 
estimation it was determined that this non-normality had little impact on the parameter 
estimates so no further modifications were made. Reported results are from OLS 
estimation of the model. 
Comparison with Linear Model 
Properties of the break-even model were compared with those of a second feeder calf 
price model with a linear specification. The linear model was based on the Buccola 
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model; however, weekly data were used here rather than the semi-annual data used by 
Buccola. Explanatory variables used in the model included corn prices and live cattle 
futures prices as well as a cattle inventory variable and the Palmer Drought Severity 
Index for central Oklahoma. Following Buccola, the inventory variable used in this 
model was the change in the January 1 all cattle inventory. The Palmer Index was 
included-also following Buccola's methodology-as a proxy for a pasture condition 
variable. Monthly dummy variables were included to account for seasonality of feeder 
prices, and a partial adjustment specification of the model was used to correct for 
autocorrelation. Coefficient estimates for the linear model are not reported here. 
Discussion will focus on the properties of the linear model. 
Results of misspecification testing on the linear model indicate that this form of 
the model is inadequate to accurately and consistently estimate feeder cattle prices. First, 
the nonlinear component of a joint conditional means test was highly significant, 
indicating that the linear functional form was inappropriate. This test also revealed 
significant correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, 
indicating that parameter estimates would not be efficient, unbiased, or consistent. 
Parameter instability was a serious problem with the linear model. A Chow test 
comparing the periods 1985-1991 and 1992-1995 indicated large differences in the 
coefficients for those periods. The corn price coefficient was particularly unstable, 
changing from a long run value of -10.450 in the earlier period to only -4.827 in the later 
period. The live cattle futures price coefficient was considerably more stable, only 
changing from 1.707 to 1.546. It appears that cyclical/seasonal variation in the technical 
feeding parameters was being reflected in the corn price coefficient of the linear model, 
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leading to that coefficient's instability. By including data on these technical parameters, 
the break-even model corrects the parameter instability and autocorrelation detected in 
the linear model. 
Implications of the Break-even Model 
The break-even model specification corrects the statistical problems of the linear model, 
which is significant in itself; however, the real economic significance of the break-even 
model is that it allows for a determination of how changes in placement weight, slaughter 
weight, and feed conversion affect the relationship between com and feeder calf prices. 
Record grain prices throughout 1995 and into 1996 focused a great deal of attention on 
this relationship. Rule of thumb estimates are certainly consistent with break-even 
budgeting; however, they are not consistent with the break-even model presented in table 
2.3. Due to the multiplicative relationships between com price, feed conversion, 
placement weight, and slaughter weight, the effect of com price on feeder cattle price 
will not be constant. A more precise estimate of the effect of com price on cattle price 
can be found in the first derivative of the long-run break even equation in table 2.3 with 
respect to com price: 
(11) BFCIBCORN = -2.305 ((SW - PW)CONV) I PW 
If equation ( 11) is evaluated at the mean values of the data for placement weight, 
slaughter weight, and conversion rate, the resulting com price multiplier is found to be 
-8.74. Given the accuracy of the long-run parameters in the feeder cattle price equation, 
the standard error of this estimate of the com price multiplier is 0.903. If the same mean 
values for placement weight, slaughter weight, and feed conversion, plus the mean values 
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for fed cattle and com price are used in the budget format presented in Table 2.1 to 
estimate a com price multiplier, the resulting com price multiplier is -7.69. Thus the 
feeder cattle price equation estimated here implies that feeder cattle prices in general 
respond more to a given com price change than the budgeting analysis implies. More 
will be discussed on this issue presently. 
It is of interest to note here that feed conversion, placement weight, and slaughter 
weight remain in the first derivative expressed in equation ( 11 ). Thus the effect of com 
price on cattle price varies with these factors. These factors are themselves quite 
variable-seasonally as well as from year to year. The key point is that this com price 
multiplier will change in response to-or is "conditioned" by-changes in placement 
weights, slaughter weights and feed conversion. Thus, it is inaccurate to consider the 
relationship between com and feeder prices as constant, as the popular rules of thumb 
imply. Seasonality of the technical factors alone will result in noticeable changes in the 
multiplier. In addition, more permanent changes in the average levels of these factors 
due to technological and institutional changes in the feeding sector will also contribute to 
the dynamic character of the multiplier. Table 2.4 shows conditional values of the com 
price multiplier under different placement weight, slaughter weight, and feed conversion 
conditions. Values in this table illustrate that even relatively small changes in the 
technical factors can significantly affect the relationship between com and feeder prices. 
Figure 2.2 shows how the multiplier changes as a result of seasonal changes in the 
technical factors. This figure illustrates that seasonal placement weight and conversion 
rate values correspond as expected with the seasonal multiplier. That is, seasonally low 
placement weights and poor conversion rates correspond to seasonally high multiplier 
22 
(absolute) values. Conversely, seasonally high placement weights and favorable 
conversion rates correspond to seasonally low multiplier values. 
Conditional multiplier values in table 2.4 indicate that producer responses to 
higher com prices can alter the relationship between com and cattle prices. At high com 
prices, producers have an incentive to economize on the use of com to produce market-
ready finished cattle. This may involve such strategies as putting more weight on calves 
with grass, leading to higher placement weights or, if possible, using relatively cheaper 
grains in feedlot rations. The net effect of these adjustments is to alter the impact that 
com price changes have on cattle prices. The conditional multiplier derived from 
equation ( 11) reflects the dynamic nature of this relationship in a way that static 
multipliers cannot. 
A Systems Interpretation of the Variable Multiplier 
The foregoing discussion suggests that producer responses to com price increases should 
mitigate the effects of these increases by changing placement weights, ration 
composition, slaughter weight, etc., thus leading to a smaller feeder cattle price reduction 
than the break-even budget predicts. However, the results from this study seem to 
contradict this line of reasoning. Specifically, the com price multiplier generated at the 
mean value of the variables in the feeder cattle price equation is -8. 75 while the budget 
derived multiplier at the same mean values is -7.69. This implies that in reality, feeder 
cattle prices change by about a dollar more per one dollar change in com price than the 
traditional break-even budget analysis implies they should. 
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An important reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the econometrically-
derived com price multiplier found here does not describe just the movement of feeder 
prices in response to com price. Rather, it describes the combined change in feeder 
cattle purchase weight and the feeder cattle price. As previously explained, the feeder 
cattle price series used is not the price for one specific weight of feeder animal, but it has 
been adjusted through a linear interpolation process to be consistent with the reported 
placement weight. Thus the variable com price multiplier cannot be directly compared 
to the static budgeted com price multiplier. 
Table 2.5 shows a sample of the model's predictions for feeder cattle prices and 
purchase weights for different combinations of com prices and finished cattle prices. As 
can be seen in the table, as com price rises, the purchase weight of feeders rises. In a 
typical feeder cattle market, prices per hundredweight for feeder cattle decline as they 
become heavier. In the data sample used in this study (1985-1995), the average decline 
in feeder cattle price over the weight range of 650-750 pounds was $3 .24/cwt. Because 
heavier feeder cattle generally sell at a discount to lighter cattle, the increase in 
placement weight associated with higher com prices will reinforce the direct effect on 
feeder prices of a com price increase. This compounding effect explains why the 
variable com price multiplier, by definition, will be larger than the static budget com 
price multiplier. 
To derive a multiplier from the budget model in Table 2.1 that is more 
comparable to the variable multiplier estimated here, it is necessary not only to change 
the com price in the budget, but also to change the placement weight and slaughter 
weight variables by the amounts which equations (7) and (8) indicate they should change 
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in response to a com price change. To illustrate this point, a $0.25 com price rise from 
the mean com price was considered. This results in a long-run increase in placement 
weight of2.99 pounds and a long-run increase in slaughter weight of2.38 pounds. If 
these weight changes are budgeted along with the $0.25 com price increase, the resulting 
multiplier is -8.24. This multiplier, while much closer to the multiplier derived from the 
derivative of the feeder cattle price equation, i.e. -8.76, is still somewhat smaller. Thus 
the implication remains that the econometric model using actual data indicates that 
actual feeder cattle price responses to changes in the com price are larger than those 
indicated by the break-even budgeting process. 
Upon further reflection, the multiplier derived from the feeder cattle price 
equation derivative (equation (11)) is not the appropriate multiplier to compare to the 
budget multiplier found when placement weight, slaughter weight, and com price are 
simultaneously changed. The derivative reported in equation (11) holds placement 
weight and slaughter weight constant at their means, despite the fact that it uses prices in 
the estimation process that assume the placement weight is changing. To derive a 
conceptually comparable multiplier, a five-equation dynamic simulation model was 
constructed consisting of equations (7) and (8) for placement weight and slaughter 
weight respectively, equations (5) and (6) which calculate revenue and cost to be used in 
the feeder cattle price equation, and the feeder cattle price equation (10). The short-run 
partial adjustment coefficients reported in table 2.3 were used to define equation (10). 
The model was simulated in the recursive sequence depicted in figure 2.1; that is, 
placement weights and slaughter weights were calculated first and then used to derive 
revenues and costs as defined by equations (5) and (6). These revenues and costs were in 
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tum used in equation (10) to calculate the feeder price. The dynamics of the model 
follow from the fact that the solution values found for placement weights, slaughter 
weights, and feeder cattle prices were then lagged one period and fed back into their 
respective equations and the system of equations solved again for the next period. This 
process was repeated until the feeder cattle price solution value stabilized. Specifically, 
all exogenous variables were set to their mean values and held constant throughout the 
simulation, except for com price. In period 0, com price was set at its mean, but in 
period 1, com price increased by $0.25/bu. Following the increase in com price, 
approximately 97 weeks of simulated recursive solutions were required for the model to 
stabilize. 
Results of the simulation are presented in table 2.6. In viewing table 2.6, it 
should be noted that the simulated values for placement weight and slaughter weight 
change only every fourth week as opposed to feeder cattle prices which change weekly. 
This is because placement weight and slaughter weight models used monthly data, and 
the feeder cattle price equation used weekly data. Simulation of these two different time 
lengths was accomplished by only allowing the lagged values for placement weight and 
slaughter weight to be updated every fourth iteration, instead of every iteration as was the 
case for the lagged feeder cattle price variable. 
Empirical validation of the simulation model was achieved by checking to ensure 
that the placement weight, slaughter weight, and feeder cattle price equations, when 
simulated independently with all variables held constant at their mean ( except corn price) 
reached the same values at equilibrium as are found when each equation is solved using 
their respective long-run coefficients and mean values for all variables ( except com 
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price, which was set at $0.25 above its mean). For the purposes of this validation, 
placement weight and slaughter weight were held constant at their mean rather than 
being allowed to dynamically adjust to the simulated com price change. The long-run 
coefficients used were derived by multiplying the parameters in each equation by 1/( 1-a ), 
where a is the parameter on the lagged dependent variable in each respective equation. 
The simulation results indicate that nearly three-fourths of the adjustment to the 
com price change is achieved in four weeks, that is, in.one month. As reported above, 
the change in the placement weight between the new equilibrium and the initial 
placement weight is 2.99 pounds and the change in the slaughter weight is 2.38 pounds. 
The simulated change in feeder cattle price is a $2.27 decline. When divided by $0.25, 
this results in a com price multiplier of -9.08. This multiplier is once again higher than 
the comparable multiplier of -8.24 as derived from the budget model when placement 
weight, slaughter weight, and com price are changed. This is due to the dynamic 
interaction of placement weight and slaughter weight changing and in tum impacting the 
dynamics of the feeder cattle price adjustment process. As placement weight rises in 
response to com price, it increases cost which in tum depresses feeder prices. An 
increase in placement weight also causes slaughter weight to increase, which causes 
revenue to rise, increasing feeder prices. On balance, the increased cost impacts of a rise 
in com prices dominate the increased revenue impacts, thus resulting in the dynamic com 
price multiplier being larger than various break-even or statistically determined 
multipliers. 
Viewing the weight and price equations as a system emphasizes that producer 
response to com price changes are aimed not at maintaining the level of feeder prices, 
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but at maintaining profitable feeding programs. By over-responding to a corn price 
increase--depressing feeder cattle prices more than is indicated to be necessary by break-
even analysis--cattle feeders generate more feeding profits in the system sooner than 
would be the case if they responded according to budgeting-based price guides. 
Similarly, when corn prices fall, feeder cattle prices are bid up more than the break-even 
budget would imply is warranted, thus removing profits quicker than they would be 
removed following budgeting pricing guides. The combined implication is that the over-
response in feeder cattle price adjustments to changes in corn price found in this study 
( evidenced by higher corn price multipliers than those derived from budgeting) leads to a 
market in which excess profits or losses due to exogenous shocks do not persist and are, 
in fact, over-compensated for. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Use of break-even budgeting indicates a corn price multiplier of about -7.5. That is, for 
every $1 rise in corn price/bu, the feeder cattle price will be depressed by $7.50/cwt. 
Multipliers close to these values have been widely cited in the popular press by 
professional economists. 
In this study, a regression model was specified which was derived directly from 
the break-even feeder price budget. The model contained as explanatory variables a 
revenue variable ( consisting of a slaughter weight times the appropriate futures price for 
live cattle) and a cost variable (incorporating estimates of placement weights, pounds of 
gain, feed conversion rates, and corn prices to proxy feeding costs). These two variables 
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together with seasonal and cyclical variables and a cattle-on-feed inventory variable were 
regressed against feeder cattle prices. 
Statistical properties of this model were far superior to a more traditional 
specification of a feeder cattle price model using corn and live cattle futures prices in a 
linear form. The most dramatic differences between the two model specifications were 
that the break-even model exhibited no autocorrelation and improved parameter stability. 
These results are not surprising given the fact that the break-even model incorporates 
important information about the physical characteristics of cattle (i.e., placement and 
slaughter weights) and about feeding efficiency (i.e., conversion rates) which is omitted 
from the simpler linear model. 
This study found that the corn price multiplier of -7.5 commonly reported in the 
literature based on break-even cattle feeding budgets underestimated the response of 
feeder cattle prices to corn price changes. Traditional break-even budget analyses of the 
impact of a corn price change on the feeder cattle market typically do not consider the 
total feeding system adjustments caused by corn price changes. This study finds the corn 
price multiplier to be nearly 1 unit higher than the break-even budget derived multiplier. 
This implies that a one dollar increase ( or decrease) in com price will result in around an 
$8.50 change in feeder cattle prices versus the $7.50 change predicted from a break-even 
model analysis, on the average. In addition, it was found that placement weights respond 
to corn price changes. Placement weights were found to rise by approximately 12 pounds 
per dollar of increase in the corn price. The placement weight changes associated with 
corn price changes reinforce the direct price impact of the corn price change on feeder 
cattle prices paid. To elaborate, higher corn prices cause feeder cattle purchasers to bid 
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down prices for a given weight of animal as well as move to heavier weight cattle which 
are typically priced lower. Thus the combined impact is to change the actual price paid 
for the cattle purchased by more than the static break-even budget analysis would imply 
when only com price is changed in the budget. However, the results further show that 
even when placement weight changes are incorporated in to the break-even budget 
analysis, the implied change in feeder cattle prices needed to reestablish a break-even 
situation is typically exceeded by the market's response by about one dollar per one 
dollar change in the com price. In other words, feeder cattle prices were estimated to 
over-respond by about 10% - 15% to a given change in com prices in comparison to the 
changes needed to return the market to break-even price levels. 
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Endnotes 
1. This method of incorporating death loss into the equations assumes that all feeding 
costs are incurred by the cattle that die-in other words, that they die on the last day of 
feeding. This is obviously an unlikely assumption; however, death loss is included in 
this model only for conceptual completeness. In addition, it was found in estimating 
the break-even model that eliminating death loss completely results in only very small 
changes in the magnitude of the revenue variable. 
2. PCC does not report the weight of cattle placed each month. Rather, they report from 
the closeout sheet of pens slaughtered the average placement weight of cattle 
slaughtered each month. They also report average number of days on feed for cattle 
slaughtered. Thus, placement weights for a given month can be deduced retroactively. 
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Table 2.1. Break-even Feeder Calf Price Estimate 
Fed Cattle Value: .............................................. 1,200 lbs x $0.74/lb = $888 
Cost of Gain: ..................................................................................... = $140.63 
Pounds of Gain= 1,200 lbs - 750 lbs= 450 lbs 
Bushels of Grain= ( 450 lbs x 7lbs grain/lb gain)/56 lbs/bu= 56.25 bu 
Cost of Gain= 56.25 bu x $2.50/bu = $140.63 
Net Revenue: .......................................................... $888 - $140.63 = $747.37/head 
Break-even Feeder Price: .................................... $747.37 + 750 lbs= $0.9965/lb 
Note: A bushel of com is assU1J1ed to weigh 56 lbs. 
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Table 2.2. Description of Variables Used in Weekly Feeder Calf Price Model 
Variable Description 
Dependent: 
FC OKC cash feeder 
calf price ($/cwt? 
Independent: 
CORN Omaha cash 
com price ($/bu / 
LC live cattle futures 
price 140 days 
forward ($/cwtf 
DCOF change in 






CONV feed conversione 
(lbs dry matter/lb gain) 
REV break-even revenue 
COST break-even cost 
a Source: Oklahoma Dept. of Agriculture 
b Source: Livestock Marketing Info. Center 
c Source: CME daily closing price 
d 
Source: USDA monthly 7 states cattle on feed report 












Table 2.3. Estimated Parameters For the Break-even Feeder Calf Price Model 
Independent Partial Adjustment Long-Run 
variables estimated coefficients S.E. estimated coefficients S.E. 
FC1-I 0.705** 0.025 
COST -0.680** 0.070 -2.309** 0.238 
REV 0.275** 0.023 0.934** 0.078 
DCOF 0.265 E -3 0.157 E-3 0.898 E -3 0.532 E -3 
D2 0.039 0.280 0.134 0.949 
D3 -0.002 0.273 -0.007 0.926 
D4 0.838** 0.281 2.845** 0.954 
D5 0.693* 0.281 2.353* 0.953 
D6 1.120** 0.282 3.802** 0.957 
D7 1.031 ** 0.284 3.501 ** 0.964 
D8 0.789** 0.296 2.680** 0.785 
D9 -0.136 0.277 -0.461 0.940 
DJO -0.451 0.274 -1.531 0.931 
Dll 0.370 0.273 1.258 0.928 
Dl2 0.157 0.274 0.535 0.930 
cos -0.812** 0.163 -2.759** 0.554 
SIN 0.054 0.122 0.184 0.413 
constant -0.958 1.176 -3.253 3.992 
F statistic 1,791.791 ** 
R2 0.984 
F statistic on monthly dummy variables 5.416** 
F statistic on cosine and sine c;ycle variables 19.317** 
Note: The number of observations was 517. Single asterisks denote significance at the 5% level; Double 
asterisks denote significance at the 1 % level. 
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Table 2.4. Corn/Feeder Cattle Price Multiplier at Different Placement 
Weight, Slaughter Weight, and Feed Conversion Levels 
Placement Weight= 675 
Slaughter Weight 
Feed Conversion 1100 1150 1200 1250 
6.25 -9.086 -10.155 -11.224 -12.293 
6.50 -9.450 -10.562 -11.673 -12.785 
6.75 -9.813 -10.968 -12.122 -13.277 
7.00 -10.177 -11.374 -12.571 -13.769 
Placement Weight= 700 
6.25 -8.246 -9.277 -10.308 -11.339 
6.50 -8.576 -9.648 -10.720 -11.792 
6.75 -8.906 -10.019 -11.133 -12.246 
7.00 -9.236 -10.391 -11.545 -12.700 
Placement Weight = 725 
6.25 -7.464 -8.460 -9.455 -10.450 
6.50 -7.763 -8.798 -9.833 -10.868 
6.75 -8.062 -9.136 -10.211 -11.286 
7.00 -8.360 -9.475 -10.590 -11.704 
Placement Weight= 750 
6.25 -6.735 -7.697 -8.659 -9.621 
6.50 -7.003 -8.005 -9.005 -10.006 
6.75 -7.273 -8.312 -9.351 -10.391 
7.00 -7.543 -8.620 -9.698 -10.775 
Placement Weight= 775 
6.25 -6.052 -6.983 -7.914 -8.845 
6.50 -6.294 -7.262 -8.230 -9.199 
6.75 -6.536 -7.541 -8.547 -9.553 
7.00 -6.778 -7.821 -8.864 -9.906 
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Table 2.5. Estimated Feeder Cattle Prices and Average Purchase Weights 
Associated With Alternative Corn and Slaughter Cattle Prices 
Com Price ($/bu) 
Slgt. Price 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.75 4.00 
($/cwt.) Estimated Feeder Cattle Price 
60 67.98 65.72 63.49 61.28 59.10 56.95 54.83 52.73 50.65 
65 75.34 73.06 70.81 68.58 66.38 64.20 62.05 59.92 57.81 
70 82.71 80.42 78.15 75.90 73.68 71.48 69.30 67.15 65.01 
75 90.09 87.78 85.50 83.23 80.99 78.77 76.57 74.40 72.24 
80 97.48 95.15 92.86 90.58 88.32 86.08 83.87 81.67 79.50 
Estimated Feeder Cattle Purchase Weight 
60 737 740 744 747 750 754 757 761 764 
65 735 738 741 744 747 750 754 757 760 
70 733 736 739 742 745 747 750 753 756 
75 731 734 737 739 742 745 748 750 753 
80 730 732 735 738 740 743 745 748 750 
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Table 2.6. Simulated Adjustments to a $0.25 Corn Price Increase 
Com Feeder % of total adjust-
Week Price Price In-wgt. Out-wgt. Multielier ment comeleted 
0 2.25 78.08 736.40 1,162.70 
1 2.50 77.42 737.56 1,162.89 -2.64 29.19 
2 2.50 76.95 737.56 1,162.89 -4.51 49.76 
3 2.50 76.62 737.56 1,162.89 -5.82 64.27 
4 2.50 76.39 737.56 1,162.89 -6.75 74.50 
5 2.50 76.22 738.27 1,163.16 -7.44 82.09 
6 2.50 76.10 738.27 1,163.16 -7.92 87.44 
7 2.50 76.01 738.27 1,163.16 -8.27 91.21 
8 2.50 .75.95 738.27 1,163.16 -8.51 93.87 
12 2.50 75.83 738.70 1,163.45 -8.98 99.12 
Equilibrium 2.50 75.81 739.39 1,165.09 -9.06 100.00 
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Figure 2.2 Average monthly values of the corn price multiplier, placement weight, 
and feed conversion rate 
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Chapter ID 
Experimental Simulation of Public Information Impacts on Price Discovery and 
Marketing Efficiency in the Fed Cattle Market 
In determining a transaction price, both buyers and sellers depend on information 
about prices paid by others. In agricultural markets, much of the price and quantity· 
information available to decision makers is collected and disseminated by government 
agencies. The amount of government-provided information was reduced throughout the 
1980s and 1990s and continues to be reduced as government agencies look for ways to 
cut their budgets in the ongoing effort to reduce federal spending. If public resources are 
to be efficiently allocated, it is vital to know the potential impact of such reductions on 
the affected markets. 
The fed cattle market--like most agricultural markets--receives considerable 
information through government reporting. 1 Furthermore, this market has undergone 
tremendous change in the last fifteen years. The market share of the four largest meat-
packing firms increased significantly over this time period. In 1980, the four largest 
meat-packers accounted for 35.7% of the total steer and heifer slaughter. By 1995, their 
share had risen to 79.3% (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration). In 
addition, cattle are increasingly traded on a forward contract basis. Forward contracts 
and marketing agreements were virtually nonexistent in 1980, but in 1996, 19 .1 % of the 
cattle slaughtered by the four largest firms were traded using these instruments (Grain 
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Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration). Structural changes related to the 
number and size of firms in the market and behavioral changes related to the increased 
use of contracting and other forms of non-price coordination may have affected the role 
of information in this market. Information asymmetries may exist due to larger firms 
having more resources to use in obtaining private information. Larger firms may also 
have more information simply due to the greater volume of their own transactions. 
Furthermore, as forward contracting increases, less information is revealed through cash 
market transactions. 
In light of these facts and the limited funding for government collection and 
reporting of information, a determination of the importance of public information to the 
efficient functioning of this market is warranted. The debate over mandatory versus 
continued voluntary price reporting provides additional incentive to investigate the role 
of information in the fed cattle market. The unwillingness of some firms to report prices 
has led to concerns that price reports are not representative of the market (Schroeder et 
al. 1997). Understanding the effect of insufficient public information on price discovery 
and marketing efficiency in the fed cattle market is necessary if policy decisions related 
to government price reporting are to be made judiciously. 
Policymakers are not the only ones interested in knowing the impacts of policy 
changes. In the fed cattle market, cattle feeders and meat-packers would certainly like to 
know how price reporting changes may affect the market in which they operate. For 
example, will a reduction in the availability of public information result in a bargaining 
advantage for either packers or feeders? Will it lead to greater risk in the market due to 
increased price variability? Knowing the answers to such questions could help market 
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participants develop strategies for dealing with any possible public information 
reductions. 
This research seeks to improve policy decisions regarding the level of public price 
reporting in the fed cattle market by determining how reductions in information affect 
that market. Specifically, it is necessary to know the effect ofreducing public price and 
quantity information on the level and variability of prices and on production efficiency in 
the fed cattle market. In pursuing these objectives, this study employs experimental 
simulation of the fed cattle market to obtain data which are then used in regression 
analysis. 
Background and Theory 
The ability of any market to function efficiently with respect to pricing depends in large 
part on the information available to market participants. Grossman and Stiglitz note that 
prices cannot perfectly reflect all available information since information is costly. The 
fact that prices imperfectly reflect information represents the necessary compensation to 
economic agents who use resources to obtain it. Consequently, an increase in the quality 
of information or a decrease in its cost will increase the informational content of prices. 
Other authors note the link between information and pricing efficiency. For example, 
Stigler equates price dispersion with ignorance in the market. He relates the level of price 
dispersion to search costs, that is, the cost to sellers of determining the bid prices of 
competitors and, what is more important, to buyers of surveying the offer prices of 
sellers. Devine and Marion characterize price dispersion as an imperfection in a market 
for a homogeneous product. They find that disseminating accurate retail price 
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information reduced price dispersion among items at competing grocery stores and 
reduced the average price level in the market. 
In agricultural markets, government reports have traditionally been the primary 
source of information concerning both prices and production. Though market 
alternatives to government reporting may exist, these alternatives may not have the same 
informational content as government reports (Carter and Galopin). 
Irwin recently examined the value of one type of public information-situation 
and outlook programs. He found that given some reasonable assumptions, public 
situation and outlook information lead to increased social welfare by increasing the speed 
of convergence to equilibrium. Such public information increases the speed of 
convergence, he argues, by educating producers about the underlying economic model 
and economic conditions and by collecting information less expensively than private 
firms. Moreover, Irwin hypothesizes that in markets characterized by imperfect 
information and/or asymmetric information, public information may force informed 
market participants to reveal more of their information through prices. This competitive 
impact of public information may be of particular importance in the imperfectly 
competitive fed cattle market. 
While Irwin examines situation and outlook reports, many other authors have 
evaluated the informational content of government production and inventory reports. 
Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf found that nearby pork belly and live hog futures prices 
responded significantly to the Cold Storage Report ( CSR) release. Colling and Irwin note 
that unanticipated information in the HPR does affect the live hog futures market but not 
enough to permit profitable trading based on that unanticipated information. In a similar 
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study of the live cattle futures market, Grunewald, McNulty, and Biere found that that 
market also responds to unanticipated information in the Cattle on Feed Report (COF). 
Additional studies have attempted to assess the informational content of 
government reports by observing the price impacts of report releases. Sumner and 
Mueller concluded that U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) harvest forecast 
announcements had a significant impact in com and soybean futures markets. Milonas 
had previously obtained similar results looking at crop report impacts on com, wheat, 
soybean oil, and soybean meal cash prices. Conversely, Patterson and Brorsen found 
little evidence that the U.S. Export Sales Report provided any new information to the 
market. 
All of these studies focused on production or inventory reports rather than price 
reports. In addition, with the exception ofMilanos, they have examined futures market 
rather than cash market responses to public information. This study is unique in that it 
investigates how a cash market (the fed cattle market) responds to a reduction in public 
price information. For this reason, the results of previous studies provide limited insight 
into what results to expect from this study. Market responses to government reports 
noted in several studies mentioned above indicate some, impact on price discovery. It can 
by hypothesized that price dispersion (variance) should increase as public information is 
reduced since participants are forced to make less informed pricing decisions; however, 
previous studies provide little basis for hypothesizing price level effects. 
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Fed Cattle Market Simulator Description, Experimental Design, and Data Collection 
The Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) allows experimental simulation of the fed 
cattle market. Within this simulated market, the decisions made by one firm directly 
influence the subsequent behavior and performance of other firms and of the market as a 
whole. Market participants must make a series of marketing decisions (e.g., when and at 
what price to buy or sell cattle) and then react to the consequences of those decisions. 
FCMS participants act as feedlot marketing managers and meat-packing 
procurement managers. Eight feedlot and four meat-packing teams, consisting of from 
two to four persons, buy and sell simulated pens of fed cattle. The number of feedlot and 
meat-packing teams is limited because the FCMS was not intended to represent a 
perfectly competitive market. Rather, it reflects the fed cattle market, that is, a few, large 
cattle feeding firms and even fewer, large meat-packing firms. 
Participants experience increasing degrees of market complexity, beginning with 
cash trading only and progressing through the addition of forward contracting and a live 
cattle futures market. Forward contracts are defined as transactions which occur this 
week for delivery two or more trading periods in the future. Market price reports do not 
include these contract prices. Futures market contracts expire at eight trading-period 
intervals, consistent with the two-month intervals for live cattle contracts on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange ( CME). Three contracts-a nearby and two distant-are open at 
all times. Because the futures contract is specifically designed for this simulated market, 
the basis is zero. 
One week in the FCMS consists of an eight-to-twelve-minute cycle. During the 
first five to seven minutes of the cycle, feeders and packers negotiate prices and finalize 
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trades. Transactions are conducted face-to-face, and decisions of participants largely 
determine the direction of market prices and the profitability of each feedlot and meat-
packing team. Generally, about 40 trades occur each week. Each feedlot has a number 
of paper pens of cattle, each sheet of paper representing 100 steers on a show list. Prices 
are negotiated and sales occur for the range of available weights of show-list cattle, from 
1,100 to 1,200 pounds in 25-pound increments. Completed transaction sheets are 
scanned into a computer for record keeping and analysis. 
Throughout the trading period, market information is provided on two digital 
display bars. One display bar scrolls cash market information (trading volume and high-
low prices) which is analogous to current market information available to fed cattle 
buyers and sellers from the Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA/AMS). The other display bar scrolls futures market information 
(trading volume and current prices for three futures market contracts) which is analogous 
to information available from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
The three-to-five-minute period following trading is an information-processing 
period or "weekend" during which each team updates its show list, calculates break-even 
prices, and formulates marketing strategy. Each period, the FCMS software provides an 
individual income statement for each team as well as summary market information for 
the preceding period. This summary information also resembles that available from 
USDA/AMS in the real-world fed cattle market. 
The data to be used in this research were collected from the FCMS during an 
agricultural economics course which met weekly in 90-minute sessions during the spring 
1996 semester at Oklahoma State University. FCMS-generated data have previously 
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been used in research relating to price discovery in the fed cattle market by Ward et al. 
and by Dowty. The data for this experiment were collected in a manner similar to the 
method of those studies. 
Trading in the FCMS course began in week 21. Feeder cattle weighing 700 
pounds are placed on feed in week 1, gain 25 pounds per week, reach the show list in 
week 17, and weigh 1,150 pounds in week 19. By week 21, there are two weeks of 
historical market information generated from a predetermined base of trading activity 
which is programmed into the simulator. This base of information provides a starting 
point for market simulation by the participants. 
Teams were rotated twice during a twelve-week preliminary learning phase 
during which no data were collected for analysis. By week 33, final teams had been 
established. Data collection began at week 37 and continued through week 96--a 
simulation period of 60 weeks or approximately one year and two months. Teams were 
rotated a final time after week 72, and trading ended after week 97. 
Each FCMS transaction represents a data point. Each transaction involves the 
sale/purchase of one pen of 100 steers between one feedlot and one packer. During the 
60 weeks of the experiment, 2,197 transactions occurred. For each of these, the 
following data were recorded: week traded, packer purchasing cattle, feedlot selling 
cattle, weight of cattle, transaction price, and type of transaction ( cash or contract). In 
addition to this transaction data, weekly data were also recorded. These data include the 
break-even price for 1,150 pound steers, boxed beef price at which meat would be sold 
that week, closing nearby futures price for the preceding week, previous week's fed cattle 
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marketings, and number of pens of cattle on the show list at the beginning of each trading 
week. 
In this experiment, the amount and type of cash market information available to 
FCMS participants was changed at predetermined intervals. 2 Two limited information 
alternatives were specified in addition to complete ( or full) information and no ( cash 
market) information. The complete information set consisted of current information 
displayed on a light bar at the front of the room as well as end-of-week summary 
information posted on the blackboard at the end of each trading session. Current 
infonnation consisted of cash and contract trading volume and high-low cash prices 
during the week being traded. This information was sent directly to the light bar from a 
scanner used to record transactions. Summary information consisted of weekly average 
cash prices by weight groups, weekly average boxed beef price, weekly average feeder 
cattle price, cost of gain, and total volume of cattle traded the preceding week. One 
incomplete information set consisted only of summary information and another consisted 
only of current information. 
One final note concerning the design of the experiment is in order. In accordance 
with experimental economics methods, participants were paid based on the profitability 
of their team (Friedman and Sunder). Performance was not continuously evaluated for 
payment purposes. Rather, participant performance was evaluated over randomly 
selected 4- to 8-week intervals. Participants were notified of the beginning of these 
payment periods but not the duration. These periods were timed so as not to coincide 
exactly with an information alternative period. Figure 3.1 gives a complete description 
of the experimental design. 
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The FCMS transactions data were used to determine what effects a reduction in 
public price information might have on the pricing and productive efficiency of the cash 
fed cattle market. Based on pricing efficiency theory, it was hypothesized that reducing 
the amount of information available to market participants would increase the within-
week price variance due to less efficient price discovery. It was further hypothesized that 
the less informative prices would lead to less efficient production. In the FCMS, the least 
cost of production or optimal marketing weight for fed cattle is 1,150 pounds. Here, 
optimal is in a comparative static sense. That is, deviations from the optimal weight 
result in less efficient use of resources and reduced revenue for the industry compared 
with what would have been realized by marketing 1,150-pound cattle. Weight deviations 
from 1,150 pounds can therefore be used as a measure of the productive efficiency lost as 
a result of reduced information.· 
Finally, it was hypothesized that reducing information would lead to lower fed 
cattle prices. This price level change would favor packers. This hypothesis is based on 
the fact that demand for fed cattle is derived from the retail demand for beef. Packers, by 
virtue of their position in the market, are in a better position than feeders to assess this 
retail demand. In the absence of objective market reporting, this fact could give packers 
an information advantage over feeders. 
Model Development 
The transaction data from the FCMS are used to estimate three basic models. Two of 
these, a transactions price model and a price variability model are based on other models 
employing FCMS data (Ward et al.; Dowty). A third model is developed to give further 
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insight into any loss of productive efficiency resulting from incomplete information. In 
the FCMS, the least cost or optimal weight for marketing fed cattle is 1,150 pounds. This 
fact quickly becomes obvious to feedlot and packer teams, as deviations from this 
optimal weight reduce their revenues. An ordered logit model with absolute weight 
deviations from 1,150 pounds as the dependent variable is estimated to determine the 
effect of limited information on participants' ability to efficiently market fed cattle. 
The selection of variables for inclusion in the two price related models is based 
on previous research into fed cattle transaction prices (Jones et al.; Schroeder et al. 1993; 
Ward 1981, 1982, 1992). Variables chosen from previous research to explain transaction 
prices for fed cattle included boxed beef prices, futures market prices, total show list, 
total weekly slaughter, potential profit/loss in the market, and individual buyers (packers) 
and sellers (feedlots). This previous research draws on the pricing process followed by 
packers in determining bid prices for fed cattle. Discussion here focuses on the variables 
specifically arising from this experiment, that is, information level dummy variables. 
Specifications of the three models are presented below. Complete variable definitions 
and their hypothesized signs are provided in table 3.1. Table 3.2 provides summary 
statistics for each of the continuous variables used in the models. 
The price level model is 
8 4 n 
Lfii6FDLI;u + LfipPACKEJs;, + Lfii8DINF~il + fi9DPAJ; + V;,, 
j=l j=l j=l 
where PRC is the transactions price for one pen of fed cattle, BBP is the lagged boxed 
beef price, FMP is the lagged fed cattle futures market price, TSL is the total pens of fed 
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cattle slaughtered, TLST is the total number of pens on the show list, PPL is the potential 
profit or loss available to the industry, FDLT are binary variables identifying the feedlot 
involved in the transaction, PACKER are binary variables identifying the packer involved 
in the transaction, DINFO are binary variables identifying information available at the 
time of the transaction, and DP A Y is a binary variable identifying payment/nonpayment 
periods. 
The price variance model is 
(2) 
8 4 n 
Ia6iFDLJ;u + Ia1iPACKE~u + "'Ia8iDINFq;, +agDPAY, +v;,, 
j=l j=l j=l 
where VPRC is the natural log of vit, the price variance estimate calculated from the price 
level model, and other variables were defined previously. 
The weight deviation model is 
(3) WTV;, =yo+ y1BBR-1 + y2TSL-1 + y3TLSTt-1 + y4PPL + 
8 4 11 
''f)1sFDL1ju+ LJ:16PACKE8;,+ LJ11DINFQu+ ysDPAYt+Vit, 
j=l j=l j=l 
where WTV is a variable indicating absolute weight deviation from 1,150 pounds, and 
other variables were defined previously. 
Specification of a logit model is possible due to the fact that cattle weight in the 
FCMS is a discrete variable. Cattle enter the show list at 1,100 pounds. Cattle not sold 
gain 25 pounds each week until they reach a maximum weight of 1,225 pounds. 3 Thus, 
absolute weight deviations from 1,150 pounds will always be 0, 25, 50, or 75 pounds. 
These values are represented by a variable with values of 0, 1, 2, and 3 representing 0, 
25, 50, and 75 pound deviations respectively. 
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In the above models, t denotes the simulation week (t = 36, 37, ... , 96) and i 
denotes transactions within a week (i = I, 2, ... , n1). In order to estimate the models, 
base feedlot and packer dummy variables must be excluded from the estimation to avoid 
perfect collinearity. Feedlot 1 and packer 1 are used as bases. 
Subscripts in the above equations indicate that these are hierarchical models since 
some variables have the same value for every transaction in a given week (i.e., they have 
no i subscript). In this experiment, numerous transactions occur each week. Goldstein 
points out that if modeling does not take into account the hierarchical nature of data, 
coefficient estimates may be inefficient; and standard errors, confidence intervals, and 
significance tests may be incorrect. To avoid the problems discussed by Goldstein, both 
price level and variance models are specified as weighted random effects models 
(WREM) for unbalanced panel data. The random effects model assumes two 
components for the error term. Thus the error term in the previous equations ( vu) can be 
represented as the sum of its components: 
(4) 
The component eu is the random variation in prices within each week while the second 
component, u1, is the random disturbance which is common to prices in each trading 
week. 
Cross-sectional heteroskedasticity will be a problem with this data due to the 
nature of this experiment. It cannot be assumed that the variance of prices will be 
constant among the different information periods established in the experiment. 
Therefore, the natural log of the squared error terms from the basic random effects model 
is used as the dependent variable in an artificial regression against the independent 
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variables. Predicted values from this regression are then used to generate weights which 
are applied to the models, resulting in weighted random effects models. All models are 
estimated using the LIMDEP 6.0 econometric program (Greene). 
Two versions of each of the three models are specified using different definitions 
for the information period dummy variables. The most basic models represent all limited 
information periods with a single dummy variable. The comparison is thus between full 
and limited information with no distinction made between the type of information 
· withheld. The second specifications use two information dummy variables: one to 
represent the withholding of current (within-week) information and another to represent 
the withholding of summary (end-of-week) information. The interaction of these two 
dummy variables represents periods when all information is withheld. Thus, under this 
definition of information periods, the following interaction term (DINF01x2) is included 
in each of the three model specifications: 
(6) DINF01x23it = (DINFOw · DINF02il), 
where DINFOJi, is as defined after equation ( 1 ). 
Results and Discussion 
Results from price level, price variance, and weight deviation models for the single 
information period specification are given in table 3.3. Table 3.4 shows results from the 
models using separate dummy variables for current and summary information. (In 
addition to these econometric results, appendix C summarizes the results of surveys 
completed by FCMS participants to determine their responses to the reduction in public 
information.) 
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Price Discovery Variables. The results of the basic single-information-period price 
model differ somewhat from previous studies using FCMS data. The effect on price of 
several of the independent variables seems to have been altered by the withholding of 
information. Boxed beef price has previously been found to have a strong relationship 
with fed cattle transaction prices (Ward et al.; Dowty). In this model, however, the 
coefficient on lagged boxed beef price, while still significant at the 0.01 level, is much 
smaller than in previous studies. The elasticity of fed cattle price with respect to boxed 
beef price at the means is 0.371. This compares to elasticities of0.792 and 0.520 
calculated using data from Ward et al. and Dowty. 
Boxed beef price was one element of the end-of-week summary information. 
When this information was withheld, boxed beef price information was not available at 
all to feedlots. Packers could determine this price from sales data on their profit and loss 
statements; however, it was not publicly available to them either. This reduced 
availability of boxed beef price may have weakened the relationship between boxed beef 
price and fed cattle transaction price. 
On the other hand, the relationship between futures market price and transaction 
price is much stronger in this model than in previous studies. This relationship is 
stronger than that between boxed beef price and transaction price. This is not consistent 
with previous FCMS studies; however, given the design of the experiment, it may not be 
surprising. Futures market prices were never withheld from participants in this study. 
They may have therefore come to rely more heavily upon these prices than boxed-beef 
prices in their decision making. The elasticity of fed cattle price with respect to futures 
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price is 0.441. In Ward et al. and Dowty, this elasticity was 0.040 and 0.265, 
respectively. 4 
The coefficient describing the relationship between lagged total show list and 
transaction price is negative and significant. This is consistent with the findings of Ward 
et al. Not consistent with Ward et al. and Dowty is the positive and significant 
coefficient on lagged total slaughter; however, this coefficient estimate is not particularly 
robust. In the price level model with two information period dummy variables, it is not 
significant at the 10% level. 
The variation in transaction prices among feedlots is greater in this study than in 
others using similar data. Average prices received by feedlots in this study had a range of 
$0.96/cwt. This compares with ranges of$0.34/cwt and $0.49/cwt for Ward et al. and 
Dowty, respectively. Apparently some feeders found more successful strategies than 
others for dealing with the lack of information. Average prices paid by packers in this 
study had a range of $0.40/cwt. This range is consistent with Ward et al. and Dowty, 
who found ranges of$0.38/cwt and $0.48/cwt, respectively. In both the price level and 
variance models estimated in this study, significant differences exist between payment 
and nonpayment periods. Price is significantly higher and variance significantly lower in 
payment periods. Dowty found no significant price level differences between payment 
and nonpayment periods; however, he did find that variance was significantly higher in 
payment periods. Since pay periods enter this experiment in exactly the same manner as 
in Dowty' s experiment, it is difficult to say why the results are not consistent. One 
logical explanation is that this difference results from the fact that entirely different 
participants were involved in each experiment. 
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Results of Price Level Models. The impact of limited information on prices is revealed 
by the coefficient on the limited information dummy variable. In the basic price model, 
that coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The effect of limited information 
on price therefore cannot be determined when all limited information periods are 
aggregated. In the second specification of the price model in which three information 
dummy variables are used ( current information, summary information, and interaction of 
the two), removal of the current trading information results in a $2.37/cwt decline in fed 
cattle prices while removal of both current and summary information results in a 
· $2.52/cwt increase in fed cattle prices. Removal of summary information alone has no 
significant impact on prices. 
Results of the price level models are difficult to interpret. Aggregating the 
limited information periods suggests that limiting public information does not affect the 
price level; however, a model specificationiusing more narrowly defined information 
variables suggests that the price effects of limited information are important and that the 
effects can be positive or negative. Removing current information reduced prices 
( favoring packers), whereas withholding all information increased prices ( favoring 
feeders). It could be argued that limiting current information gives packers an advantage 
since they are in a better position to assess the remaining summary information--
particularly boxed beef price and total slaughter figures. With the removal of all 
information, however, neither packers nor feeders have an advantage. The increase in 
price simply reflects higher search costs incurred by packers and feeders who must now 
survey the market on their own to determine a purchase or sale price instead of simply 
relying on public information (Stigler 1961). Clearly, these hypotheses are ad hoc and 
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are only offered as a possible explanation for the results obtained here. Reasonable 
alternative hypotheses would argue for opposite results, particularly for the effects of 
removing all information. More research is needed to clearly define any price level 
effects that may result from limiting information. 
Results of Price Variance Models. The results of the price variance model are more 
conclusive than those of the price level model when aggregated information periods are 
considered. The coefficient on the information dummy variable is positive and highly 
significant, indicating an increase in price variance due to limited information. This is 
consistent with hypothesized results. 
Results again become more ambiguous as efforts are made to determine effects of 
different types of information. In the second specification of the variance model, 
variance is increased by removal of current information and by removal of all 
information. Removal of summary information, however, decreases the variance of 
pnces. 
The price variance model provides stronger evidence of the importance of public 
information to the efficient functioning of the fed cattle market than does the price level 
model. The aggregate information period model shows conclusively that limiting 
information increases price variance. Evidence further indicates that limiting current 
information definitely increases price variance; however, in the second model limiting 
summary information decreases price variance. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that 
limiting summary information would lead to greater reliance on current price 
information. The resulting inertia could perhaps reduce price variability. This does not 
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mean that limiting summary information would result in a more efficient market. On the 
contrary, if prices fail to quickly register changes occurring in underlying supply/demand 
conditions, the market would be much less efficient from a resource allocation standpoint 
in spite of the increased price stability. 
Results of Pricing Efficiency Models. The effect of limiting information on the 
efficiency of the market is further examined using an ordered logit model with absolute 
weight deviations from the optimal 1, 150-pound weight as the dependent variable. 
Results of the single period model clearly indicate that limiting information results in 
marketing fed cattle at higher deviations from the least cost weight. The second 
specification of the model indicates that these higher deviations are due to the removal of 
summary information. 
, Direct observation of FCMS transaction data from the experiment clearly shows 
that weight deviations were toward heavier and less cost-efficient weights. Just over half 
of all fed cattle were marketed at 1,175 pounds. Only 6% were marketed at the least 
cost, 1,150 pound weight. This is not at all consistent with results of previous use of the 
FCMS. Figure 3.2 compares the marketing weights obtained under this experiment with 
those obtained from the FCMS when no experiment was being conducted. These results 
suggest that removing summary information results in lost efficiency regardless of the 
price variance effects of removing information. 
The most significant result of the logit model is that the productive efficiency of 
the industry is reduced. Rausser, Perloff, and Zusman define productive efficiency as 
requiring that each firm produces in a manner which places the economy on its 
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production possibilities frontier. That is not the case when cattle are fed to heavier-than-
optimal weights. Resources must be expended in cattle feeding which would be better 
utilized elsewhere. This represents a loss to society, not just to cattle feeders. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Data from the FCMS were used to assess the impact of limiting infonnation on the 
efficiency of the fed cattle market. Results of the econometric models developed here 
indicate that the absence of current market information created inefficiencies. This was 
evidenced by increased transaction price variance and by the increased marketing of fed 
cattle at less industry-efficient weights as a consequence of the removal of information 
from the market. The results of this experimental simulation also provide evidence that 
traditional, predictable economic relationships may be altered in the absence of public 
market information, thereby contributing to pricing inefficiencies. Differences in 
econometric results for this study compared with two previous studies suggest that 
removing and restoring different types and amounts of information into the FCMS altered 
the normal economic relationships between transaction prices and traditional variables, 
particularly boxed beef prices but also futures market prices and fed cattle marketings to 
a lesser extent. 
Looking only at price level impacts, it is impossible to determine which sector of 
the industry stands to lose most from reduced market information. Price impacts were 
sometimes in the feeders' favor and sometimes in the packers'. Rather than focusing on 
who stands to gain or lose from reducing public information, the price variance and 
weight deviation models focus investigate factors which impact the competitiveness of 
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the entire industry. Results of the price variance model indicate that reducing market 
information definitely increases price variance and, consequently, the price risk faced by 
all market participants. Results of the weight deviation model reveal that reducing public 
information leads to a loss in production efficiency, in other words, inefficient use of the 
resources employed in feeding cattle. 
Both of these factors--increased price risk and decreased production efficiency--
raise costs in the fed cattle industry. Ginn and Purcell contend that higher costs due to 
price risk are in some measure responsible for beefs loss of market share to poultry and 
pork in the 1980s. While their hypothesis is only one of many possible explanations for 
beefs loss of market share, it does correctly emphasize that higher costs reduce the 
competitiveness of the beef industry. If reducing public information increases costs due 
to risk and production inefficiencies-as this research suggests it will-then feeders and 
packers may need to consider how any public policy change regarding public market 
information could affect the competitiveness of the entire beef industry rather than 
focusing on which side may gain a short-term advantage over the other. 
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Endnotes 
1. The term government reporting as used here encompasses the collection and 
compilation of data as well as its dissemination in government reports. 
2. It is critical to note the distinction being made here between cash and futures market 
information. This experiment involved varying levels of cash market information. 
Futures market information was available to participants at all times. This is 
appropriate given the objective of this experiment, i.e., to assess the market impacts of 
publicly funded information such as that provided by USDA/AMS. Futures market 
information, while public in the sense of being widely available, would more 
appropriately be considered private information for the purpose of this study since 
public funds are not used in its collection/dissemination. 
3. Feedlots can sell cattle weighing 1,200 pounds. Cattle unsold at the end of the trading 
week in which they weigh 1,200 pounds are automatically sold to an anonymous 
packer for a large discount in price, beginning at $5/cwt below the average price that 
week. All cattle sold to the anonymous packer weigh 1,225 pounds. 
4. A price level model containing interaction terms between the single information 
period dummy variable and these two independent variables was estimated. 
Interaction terms were not significant. The fact that information was withheld would 
likely affect participants' reliance on the information, even when it was fully 
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available. For this reason, interaction terms which compare the impacts of the 
variables between full and limited information periods will not provide a reliable test 
of the effect of limiting information. Thus, the models reported in this article do not 
contain interaction terms. 
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Table 3.1. Variable Names and Definitions for Price Level, Price Variance, and 
Weight Deviations Model 














Transaction price for ith pen 
of fed cattle ($/cwt.) in week t 
Estimate of ith transaction price 
variance ($/cwt.) calculated 
from price level model in week t 
Dummy variable indicating absolute 
value of weight deviation from 1, 150# 




Boxed beef price ($/cwt.) for Choice Yield + 
Grades 1-3, 550-700 lb. carcasses, lagged 
one week 
Closing live cattle futures price ($/cwt.) for + 
nearby contract, lagged one week 
Total pens slaughtered (lOOhd./pen), lagged 
one week 
Total pens on market-ready show list, lagged 
one week 
Potential profit or loss in week t. Equal to 
largest packer's break-even price ($/cwt.) 
for 1,150 lb. cattle less the mean feedlot 
break-even price ($/cwt.) for 1,150 lb. cattle 
Binary variables identifying individual feed- +/-
lots involved in ith transaction in week t. 
J = 2, ... ,8. 
Binary variables identifying individual +/-
packers involved in ith transaction in 
week t. J = 2, ... ,4 
Binary variable identifying week t +/-
as payment or nonpayment period 
Binary variables identifying which of j +/-
available information sets the ith price level model 
transaction in week t occurred under. + 
variance model 
+ 
wgt. dev. model 
a This variable was not used in the weight deviation model. 
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for FCMS Spring 1996 Data 
Weeks 37-96 
Variable Units Mean SD 
Fed cattle price $/cwt. 78.30 3.622 
Pens slaughtered 36.91 7.511 
Pens on show list 129.30 21.316 
Boxed beef price $/cwt. 123.65 5.447 
Futures market price . $/cwt. 79.12 2.955 
Potential profit/loss $/cwt. 0.77 3.891 
Fed cattle weight lbs. 1,185.84 21.163 
64 
Table 3.3. Estimated Coefficients for Price Level, Price Variance, and Weight 
Deviation Models Using Single Information Period Dummy Variables 
Variables Price Model Price Variance Model Weight Deviation Model 











(4.291) (-6.779) (-1.731) 
0.436** 0.010 NIA 
(5.863) (0.384) 
0.082* -0.101 ** 
(2.165) (-7.406) 





























































Note: Single asterisk denotes significance at 0.05 level; double asterisk denotes significance at 0.01 
level. t-Statistics are given in parentheses. Price level model measures the fed cattle transaction price 
level. Price variance model measures the estimated price variance calculated from the errors of the price 
model. Weight deviation model measures the deviation of slaughter weights from 1150 pounds. 
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Table 3.4. Estimated Coefficients for Price Level, Price Variance, and Weight 
Deviation Models Using Information Type Variables with Interaction Term 
Variables Price Model Price Variance Model Weight Deviation Model 













(2.085) (-3.680) (-1.639) 
































2.521 * 0. 808* 
(2.280) (2.214) 
1.033** -0.485** 






































Note: Single asterisk denotes significance at 0.05 level; double asterisk denotes significance at 0.01 level. t-










week 37 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Note: A represents full information periods; B represents the removal of current information; C represents the removal of summary information; 
and D represents the removal of all cash market information. Teams were rotated at the end of week 72. 
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Note: Experimental data consist of 2,197 observations collected from 
simulator weeks 37 to 96. Base data consist of2,682 observations col-




Figure 3.2 Comparison of FCMS fed cattle marketings by weight group: 
experimental vs. base data 
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Chapter IV 
Estimated Value of Non-Price Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle Market 
Every agricultural product sold in a retail market must first go through a number 
of intermediate steps in reaching that market. Vertical coordination is a broad term 
referring to all of the methods by which activities at various stages of the 
production/marketing chain are "harmonized" (Mighell and Jones). In the past, and even 
today in many parts of the world, it is not unusual for all of these activities to be carried 
out by the same person or family. In modem developed economies, however, different 
people perform different functions in converting raw commodities to finished goods. 
Traditionally, in modem market economies, prices have been the coordinating 
mechanism. Price signals originating with consumers are passed from firm to firm down 
the marketing chain until reaching producers. As early as 1959, Collins noted that the 
price system was, in some industries, proving to be inadequate as a means of 
coordinating the activities of various stages of the marketing chain. He argued that prices 
may not provide clear enough signals to efficiently direct economic activity when 
decisions made at one stage of production affect the performance of successive stages. 
Barkema points out that the inability of prices to transmit detailed information is an even 
greater problem in the modem food market due to increased consumer demands for more 
specialized food products. 
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Examples of coordination through non-price means can be found in virtually 
every sector of the agricultural industry; however, the most dramatic examples of non-
price coordination are in the livestock sector. Non-price coordination in the poultry 
industry has been extensive. Every level of production and marketing from farmer to 
retailer is coordinated through direct ownership (vertical integration) or contracting. In 
the last decade, the pork industry has also witnessed a significant increase in the use of 
non-price coordination methods. 
The beef industry has not embraced non-price coordination to the same extent as 
the poultry and pork industries. While the beef industry has undergone dramatic changes 
in the last 20 years, these changes have had more to do with the consolidation of firms 
within the packing and feeding sectors than with changes in the nature of the interface 
between the sectors (Barkema and Drabenstott). Coordination between the various levels 
of the beef industry is still primarily achieved by the price system. Because of the 
adversarial relationship betwee? feeders and packers, coordination between these levels 
( or more specifically the lack of coordination) may be inefficient. Inefficient 
coordination increases costs and results in greater risk for beef industry participants. The 
effect, therefore, of inefficient coordination is to reduce the competitiveness of the beef 
industry in relation to the more efficiently coordinated poultry and pork industries. Due 
to the competitive pressure from poultry and pork, it would be extremely useful for beef 
industry participants to know the potential benefits (in terms of industry-level profits) of 
improving coordination between the feeding and packing sectors. 
In addition to these applied considerations, a study of vertical coordination in the 
fed cattle market has compelling theoretical justification. The economics literature 
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discusses the nature of, causes for, and conceptual benefits from vertical coordination via 
non-price methods. However, since economists rarely have the opportunity to measure 
performance criteria for various forms of vertically coordinated structures, empirical 
estimates of the value of coordination are noticeably absent in the literature. Similarly, 
there are no estimates of whether one set of parties (buyers or sellers) or both gain or 
lose, and how much one set gains or loses relative to the other. As Den Ouden et al. note: 
In spite of the extensive descriptive literature on the potential benefits and 
costs of improved vertical coordination, there seems to be little 
quantitative information on its effects both at the overall level of the chain 
and with respect to the individual stages (p. 287). 
The objective of this research is to determine the value of coordinated marketing-
purchasing between cattle feeders and meatpackers. Two separate effects of non-price 
coordination will be noted. First, this research will determine how industry-wide profit is 
affected by the employment of various non-price coordination strategies. If profits can 
be increased by the use of non-price coordination, then the incentive to adopt such 
strategies exists. The second step in this research will be to determine how the different 
coordination strategies considered will affect the costs of both feeders and packers. For 
non-price coordination to be an attractive option, costs must be reduced on both sides of 
the market. 
To accomplish the goals of this study, data generated in a semester long session 
of the Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) will be used (Koontz, et al.). A comparison 
of the industry profits actually realized in the simulation will be compared with those 
which could have been realized using relatively simple "rule-of-thumb" coordination 
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strategies based on slaughtering the volume of cattle packers desire and/or the weight of 
cattle feedlots desire. 
Vertical Coordination Background and Theory 
The fact that prices convey information imprecisely provides an incentive for firms to 
implement non-price methods of coordination. Many authors have explored the 
incentives to adopt non-price coordination methods. Among them, Frank and Henderson 
cite "asset specificity" as an incentive for vertical coordination. This incentive appears 
to be particularly relevant to the fed cattle market. Asset specificity refers to the fact that 
much of the capital used in a productive process may have no alternative uses. 
Consequently, costs rise rapidly if these assets are unemployed or underemployed. 
Contracting can help to avoid this situation. 
Frank and Henderson build on the theory of Willamson which divides investments 
into three categories: nonspecific, mixed, and idiosyncratic. Idiosyncratic investments 
have very specific uses. Conversely, nonspecific investments can be put to a number of 
different uses. Mixed investments fall somewhere on a continuum between these 
extremes. Williamson argues that contracting will be the cost minimizing method of 
coordinat_ion between levels when recurring transactions occur between participants 
whose investments are mixed. As the characterization of investments becomes more 
idiosyncratic, direct ownership (vertical integration) becomes the cost minimizing 
coordination method. 
The foregoing discussion of the incentives for vertical coordination is a useful 
starting point for investigating non-price coordination in the fed cattle market. All of the 
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incentives offered by the various authors discussed here are present to varying degrees in 
this market. Williamson's focus on idiosyncratic investment is particularly relevant 
given the fed cattle market structure which has evolved over the last 15 years. The 
largest packing firms have invested in large plants that must run at full capacity or face 
steep production cost increases. Koontz and Purcell note that because of their relatively 
high ratios of fixed to variable costs, packers have strong incentive to operate at full 
capacity in order to minimize per unit costs. Schroeder et al. point out that several of the 
noted incentives to contracting also apply to feeders. For example, contracting allows 
feeders to reduce risk, to obtain more favorable financing terms, and to ensure a buyer for 
their cattle. 
Still, non-price coordination is not carried on in the fed cattle market at nearly the 
levels observed in other livestock markets. Part of the difference in market structure 
between different livestock markets can be explained by the biological differences 
between livestock (Ward). For example, cattle production is subject to much longer 
production delays than either poultry or pork production. In addition, cattle production 
relies on the ability of cattle to consume forages. This makes cattle production much 
more land-intensive than other types of livestock production. However, the lack of non-
price coordination in the fed cattle market must, to some degree, be attributed simply to 
the reluctance of market participants at different levels to cooperate with one another. 
The current furor over captive supply levels is itself evidence.of the adversarial 
relationship between feeders and packers. 
This adversarial relationship should not be surprising to economists. Perry writes 
that when the investments of participants on one or both sides of a transaction are 
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idiosyncratic, "opportunistic behavior" is likely to result. Such behavior consists of 
trying to extract all of a trading partner's profit by threatening to dissolve the trading 
relationship. The presence of opportunistic behavior makes cooperation between the two 
groups more difficult to achieve; however, it also indicates that the potential gains from 
cooperation may be substantial. This research is concerned with quantifying these 
potential gains. As noted, empirical studies of the effects of vertical coordination are 
virtually nonexistent. This study thus represents an important addition to vertical 
coordination literature. 
Fed Cattle Market Simulator Background 
Data for this experiment were collected in the Spring 1995 semester when the FCMS was 
run as a semester-long undergraduate class at Oklahoma State University. As the name 
suggests, the FCMS simulates the real-world fed cattle market. Participants are divided 
into 12 teams.consisting of from two to four members. Eight teams role-play as feedlot 
managers, and four teams role-play as packing plant managers. The teams interact to 
trade simulated pens offed cattle. Face-to-face negotiation between feedlot and packing 
plant teams determines the fed cattle price in the FCMS. 
Trading in the FCMS takes place in six-to-eight minute periods which correspond 
to a week of real time. At the beginning of each of these simulated weeks, feedlot teams 
receive a set of cards representing cattle entering the showlist. Each card represents one 
pen consisting of 100 head of 1,100 pound cattle. Each week that the cattle aren't sold, 
they gain 25 pounds. If cattle are not sold by the end of the week in which they weigh 
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1,200 pounds, they are automatically sold to an anonymous packer for a large discount 
beginning at $5/cwt below that week's average price. 
The two largest costs faced by feeders are the purchase cost of feeder calves and 
feed costs. Purchase costs are exogenous to the FCMS. Feeders receive a predetermined 
number of 700 pound feeder animals at a predetermined price. Ration/feed costs are set 
exogenously; however, cost of gain depends to a large extent on the actions of the feedlot 
managers. Cost of gain for 1,100 to 1,150 pound cattle can be calculated simply as 
pounds of gain times ration cost per pound of gain; however, as cattle reach weights in 
excess of 1,150 pounds, they begin to incur cost of gain penalties reflecting the fact that 
heavier cattle convert feed less efficiently than lighter cattle. The penalty for 1,175 
pound cattle is 8% of the total cost of gain and for 1,200 pound cattle it is 18% of the 
total cost of gain. To illustrate, the feed cost for a 1,200 pound animal in the FCMS 
would be calculated as follows: 
(1) [(1,200 lb. - 700 lb.)• (RC. 1.18)], 
where RC is the ration cost per pound of gain. 
The weight of cattle also has an important affect on the prices which feedlots 
receive for their cattle. Packers discount for three important carcass characteristics when 
calculating bid prices. These factors are percent of carcasses grading select, percent of 
yield grade 4 and yield grade 5 carcasses, and percent of carcasses which are light or 
heavy. The sum of these discounts is the smallest for 1,150 pound cattle. Table 4.1 
shows the carcass characteristics assumed for the five weight classes of cattle in the 
FCMS along with discount factors used by packers in calculating bid prices. 
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On the packer side, cost is a function of the number of pens slaughtered each 
week. Each firm faces a U-shaped short-run cost curve. These weekly cost curves were 
developed for the simulator based on research by Duewer and Nelson. Each curve is 
different, reflecting the different sizes of the packing plants in the simulator. The 
optimal weekly slaughter size for the smallest packer is 800 head and for the largest is 
1,200 head. The other two plants have optimal weekly slaughter rates of 900 and 1,100 
head. Because of the shape of the cost curves, any deviation above or below these 
optimal slaughter rates results in increased costs for the packers. Table 4.2 reports the 
short-run cost curves for each plant in the FCMS, and figure 4.1 illustrates the shape and 
relationship of the four curves. 
Marketing decisions affect packer profitability through returns as well as through 
costs. This is due to the manner in which boxed beef price is determined in the 
simulator. Weekly boxed beef prices are specified as a function of slaughter levels for 
the past 9 weeks. The average boxed beef price is $120/cwt and is based on an average 
slaughter level of 40 pens of 1,150 pound cattle, which is the sum of the four packers' 
optimal slaughter levels. Deviations from this slaughter level alter the boxed beef price 
according to a distributed lag of price flexibilities. Given this boxed beef demand 
specification, slaughtering a larger than optimal number of pens of cattle not only 
increases packer costs but also reduces packer revenue through the behavior of boxed 
beef prices. Slaughtering cattle weighing more than 1,150 pounds will also depress 
boxed beef price by increasing the total pounds of beef on the market. Figure 4 .2 graphs 
the long-run boxed beef demand function used by the FCMS, that is, the price that will 
result from 9 consecutive weeks of slaughtering a given number of pens. Figure 4.3 
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graphs the weekly and cumulative distributed lag pattern for the boxed beef price 
flexibilities, which reveals the impact of a given lagged slaughter level on boxed beef 
price. The distributed lag model depicted in figure 4.3 was econometrically estimated by 
Meyer. 
Vertical Coordination Simulation Methods 
In this study packer and feeder profits from the Spring 1995 FCMS course will be 
compared to profits obtained using simple non-price coordination strategies. 
Consideration ofFCMS structure as outlined above suggests that strategies which 
minimize feeding inefficiencies and slaughter/fabrication costs have some potential for 
improving industry profits. Thus, coordination strategies examined in this study will 
focus on marketing cattle at minimum cost of production weights (i.e., 1,150 pounds) and 
marketing as close as possible to an optimal number of pens per week for packing plant 
efficiency (i.e., 40). 
In order to perform the simulation required to make comparisons necessary for 
this study, a spreadsheet was developed which would calculate aggregate weekly feedlot 
and packer costs and weekly boxed beef prices based on the number and weight of cattle 
sold each week. Since all feedlots face identical costs (i.e., they all buy cattle at the same 
price and have the same cost-of-gain), aggregating feedlots simply involved summing the 
number of pens marketed at each weight each week and calculating costs for each weight 
group as illustrated in equation ( 1 ). 
Aggregating packers was somewhat more difficult since each packer faces a 
different short-run cost curve. The solution to this problem involved creating an 
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aggregated cost schedule within the spreadsheet used for simulation which contains the 
cost incurred by each packer from the slaughter of a given number of pens. Such a 
schedule is given in table 4.2. Using this aggregated industry schedule, the least-cost 
distribution among packing plants of any number ofpens could be determined. Using 
this aggregation procedure for packer costs, it was only possible to consider total weekly 
slaughter figures rather than each packer's weekly slaughter level. This method of 
aggregation assumes that weekly slaughter is distributed among packers in a least-cost 
manner; however, this is certainly not always the case in reality or in the simulations with 
live participants. Thus, this method understates packers' costs. The costs resulting from 
individual packers slaughtering a non-optimal number of pens will be removed in this 
analysis. 
In this experiment, the flow of fed cattle generated by FCMS participants was 
entered into the spreadsheet simulator. This simulation generates the industry profit 
totals shared by feeders and packers. This flow of fed cattle was then varied within the 
spreadsheet according to five simple coordination rules. The total number of cattle 
marketed was not changed: the same number of cattle was used in each simulation, but 
the timing of these marketings was varied, which also resulted in the weights and 
individual weekly volumes changing. 
Non-price Coordination Strategies 
Data on marketings from weeks 29 through 98 from the FCMS were used to establish 
baseline profits in the simulation spreadsheet. Costs and returns from this simulation 
were compared to five simple non-price coordination strategies. All of these strategies 
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represent variations on the premise of minimizing production costs. For feeders, this 
amounts to avoiding the extra feeding costs that result from marketing cattle at weights 
other than 1,150 pounds. For packers, it amounts to avoiding the extra processing costs 
which result when slaughter plant volume is not equal to 40 pens and price discounts 
which result from the purchase of cattle at weights other than 1150 pounds. In addition, 
each strategy impacts industry profits through its effect on the total volume of boxed beef 
produced and the boxed beef discounts received (see table 4.1 ). 
The first strategy was to market 40 pens each week. This strategy avoids all 
excess processing costs by keeping packers always at the lowest point of the aggregated 
cost curve. In order to ensure a sufficient supply of cattle on the showlist to meet the 40 
pen requirement, cattle must be marketed at heavier weights. Thus this strategy should 
generate considerable feeding inefficiencies. In addition, the increase in the marketing of 
heavy cattle will depress the boxed beef price due to increased quantity and quality 
discounts. 
The second strategy was to sell all cattle at 1,150 pounds. This strategy avoids all 
costs associated with feeding inefficiency and price discounts for undesirable carcass 
characteristics. The strategy is simple to implement. Each week, all pens of cattle 
weighing 1,150 pounds are marketed, regardless of how many pens this may be. Since 
marketings will seldom equal 40 pens, processing costs should increase under this 
strategy. On the other hand, by avoiding the slaughter of heavy cattle, this strategy 
should increase boxed beef price. 
The third strategy represents a slight modification of the previous one. One-third 
of the cattle on the showlist weighing 1,125 pounds were sold each week, with the 
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remaining two-thirds being sold the following week at 1,150 pounds. This strategy 
attempts to maintain a more consistent flow of cattle than the previous strategy-thereby 
reducing processing costs. The choice of one-third as the proportion of 1,125 pound 
cattle to slaughter is arbitrary. It is possible that selling some other fraction of cattle 
earlier would be as effective or even more effective in reducing processing costs. This 
strategy should also increase the boxed beef price due to the slaughter of some lighter 
cattle. 
The last two strategies are quite similar and represent compromises between the 
first two. Strategy four was to sell 40 pens per week or less (if 40 weren't available) at 
weights between 1,125 and 1,175 pounds. The least cost slaughter volume is specified as 
a target; however, cattle may not be slaughtered at extreme weights in order to reach that 
target. The fifth strategy was to sell 40 pens per week or less (again, if 40 weren't 
available) at weights at or below 1,150 pounds. In each of these strategies, the costs of 
non-optimal marketings will be shared by packers and feeders. In strategy 5, though, 
boxed beef price should increase significantly since a substantial number oflight (i.e., 
less than 1,150 pounds) cattle will be slaughtered. 
Simulation Results 
Table 4.3 presents total costs and returns from the simulations along with information on 
the volume of cattle and boxed beef traded under each of the non-price coordination 
strategies. Table 4.4 presents the cost and return data on both a per head and per 
hundredweight of boxed beef basis. It is important to view the results on a per unit basis 
since each of the coordination strategies results in slightly different volumes of cattle and 
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of boxed beef. The selection of a relevant unit depends to some degree upon one's 
perspective. Feedlot managers would probably prefer to analyze their costs and returns 
on a per head basis, while packing plant managers would probably prefer to view those 
figures per hundredweight of boxed beef. For this reason, results are presented both 
ways. 
All but one of the non-price coordination strategies resulted in higher industry-
level profits than those realized by FCMS participants. Strategy 1, consisting of always 
selling 40 pens, actually resulted in industry losses of $26.06/head ($3.56/cwt boxed 
beet). There are two reasons for this result. First, in order to consistently meet the 40-
pen target, the showlist had to be kept full. To do this, cattle had to be held to high 
weights. This resulted in high price discounts and high feeding costs. In fact, this 
strategy resulted in the highest price discounts and cost of gain of any other strategy 
(including no coordination). Second, the high boxed beef supply resulting from the 
slaughter of a large number of heavy cattle pushed boxed beef prices down, further 
reducing industry profits. Boxed beef supplies were higher and prices lower under this 
strategy than any other. From the packer's perspective, however, this strategy is not all 
bad. Processing costs on a per head and per hundredweight of boxed beef basis were 
considerably lower under this strategy than under any other. 
The second non-price coordination method-sell all cattle at 1,150 pounds-
resulted in a $10.63/head ($1.48/cwt boxed beet) increase in profits in comparison to no 
coordination. Nearly all of this gain was due to cost of gain reductions. Cost of gain 
decreased by $11.81/head ($1.37/cwt boxed beet) under this strategy. Net revenue was 
actually reduced slightly due to the lower volume of boxed beef sold. Processing costs 
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were reduced; however, these costs were over $2/head ($0.88/cwt boxed beef) higher 
than under strategy I-always slaughter 40 pens. 
The third strategy-sell one-third of each age group of cattle at 1,125 pounds and 
the remaining two-thirds at 1,150 pounds the following week-was expected to reduce 
processing costs in comparison to the preceding strategy. On a per head basis, it did 
exactly that; however, on a per hundredweight of boxed beef basis, processing costs were 
higher under this strategy than under any other. The average boxed beef price did 
increase slightly over that from the previous strategy due to the lower boxed beef volume. 
This strategy had the lowest average live weight and carcass weight per head. On a per 
head basis, results of this strategy-as expected-are similar to the previous strategy: 
industry profits increased by around $10/head ($1.45/cwt boxed beef) over no 
coordination, with the bulk of that increase due to reduced cost of gain. Cost of gain was 
lower under this strategy than under any other. 
The compromise strategies (four and five) worked quite well in increasing 
aggregate profits-both total and per unit of output. Compared with no coordination, 
strategy four increased industry-level profits by $22.47/head ($3.14/cwt boxed beef), and 
strategy five increased profits by $25.10/head ($3.52/cwt boxed beef). The effects of 
these strategies on costs and returns were very similar. Both resulted in higher net 
revenue than no coordination due both to increased boxed beef price and reduced price 
discounts. Both also reduced processing costs (per head and per hundredweight of boxed 
beef) over no coordination. The primary difference in these strategies is in their effect on 
cost of gain. Strategy 5 results in a lower cost of gain due to the fact that this strategy 
avoids the cost of gain penalty associated with 1,175 pound cattle. 
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BEEFGAIN Simulation 
The parameter structure of the FCMS causes the cost of gain for heavy cattle to rise 
rapidly, that is, 8% for 1,175 pound cattle and 18% for 1,200 pound cattle. This reduces 
total industry profit. Likewise, as cattle reach heavier weights, the FCMS assumes that 
more yield grade 4 (Y 4) and heavy weight carcasses are present. The FCMS discounts 
the boxed beef price received by packers by $10/cwt for Y4 cattle and $2/cwt for heavy 
carcasses. This results in an industry profit curve (i.e., profits to be divided between 
packers and feeders) by weight which rises from 1,100 pounds to 1,150 pounds and then 
declines. A key question is how realistic relative to actual market conditions is this 
pattern of relative profits by slaughter weight. 
It should be noted that this profit is the combined profit of packers and feedlots. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates how industry profit/cwt appears graphically as the area between the 
break-even prices of feedlots and packers. If one assumes these profits to be shared 
equally at all weights ( a big assumption), the profit pattern for feedlots will also be 
concave downward and peaking at 1,150 pounds for both the feedlot and packer. 
Presumably, most ofthis decline in profits is suffered at heavier weights by 
feedlots; however, the spreadsheet simulation done here is not capable of distinguishing 
how the reduced profits are split between feedlots and packers. Actual profit distribution 
as generated with live simulations with the FCMS can be referenced to determine how 
profits/losses are shared by packers and feedlots for different weights of cattle. 
Additional simulation to determine the effect on profits of under- or over-
finishing cattle was also possible using BEEFGAIN, a feedlot gain simulator developed 
by animal scientists at Oklahoma State University (Gill and Burditt). This simulator 
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calculates the physical as well as financial perfonnance of cattle on feed based on 
parameters provided as input. In order to make comparisons between feedlot profits 
achieved at various slaughter weights, simulation of the feeding of 700 pound feeder 
steers to a series of different weights was conducted. Slaughter weights used in the 
simulation correspond to the slaughter weights used in the FCMS (i.e., 1,100 to 1,225 
pounds in 25 pound intervals). A feeder cattle price of $7 4/cwt was used in the 
simulation. A fed cattle price of $69/cwt was also used. This price was discounted 
according to the carcass characteristics expected at the different slaughter weights. 
Two different fed cattle price-discounting regimes are compared in this study. 
First, carcass characteristics are not considered in setting price. In this simulation, all 
cattle receive the same price regardless of weight. The common price used is $67.75/cwt. 
This price was arbitrarily chosen. The price used in this simulation affects the level of 
profits but does not alter the relationship between profits and slaughter weight, which is 
the subject of this investigation. Second, carcass characteristics are based on the results 
of previous serial slaughter studies (Hicks et al. and Van Koevering et al.). These studies 
were designed experiments in which cattle of very similar physical characteristics were 
placed on feed together. All cattle received the same treatment throughout the feeding 
period. The cattle were divided into four subgroups which were slaughtered at fourteen 
day intervals beginning with 100 days on feed. At slaughter, the physical characteristics 
of each carcass were carefully examined and measured. Relevant characteristics for this 
study include the percent of U.S. Select carcasses, the percent of yield grade 4 or 5 
carcasses, the percent of light and heavy carcasses, and the average dressing percentage. 
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The weights of the serially slaughtered cattle do not correspond exactly with those 
used in the FCMS; however, the days on feed correspond closely to what is assumed in 
the FCMS. The four weight groups from the serial slaughter studies are thus assumed to 
correspond to 1,075, 1,125, 1,175, and 1,225 pounds. Figures on the relevant carcass 
characteristics for 1,100, 1,150, and 1,200-pound cattle are calculated by linear 
interpolation. Price discounts corresponding to the undesirable carcass characteristics 
are based on average market conditions. Price discounts and carcass characteristics used 
in this discounting regime are given in table 4.5. 
BEEFGAIN Results 
Results of the BEEFGAIN simulation indicate that profits decrease substantially when 
cattle are over-finished. The amount of the decline in profits and the rate at which this 
decline occurs depend to a large degree upon the discounts for undesirable carcass 
' characteristics. These discounts are variable and, like cattle and boxed beef prices, 
respond to conditions in the market. Figure 4.5 illustrates the relationship between 
profits and slaughter weights for both of the discounting regimes. In addition, this figure 
includes a profit curve from the FCMS. This curve represents one-half of the industry-
level profits available under average cost of gain conditions (i.e., cost of gain equal to 
$0.46/lb) in the FCMS. The level of this curve is determined by the feeder cattle and 
boxed beef prices used in calculating feedlot and packer break-even prices. Again, the 
level of this curve is not important for an examination of the relationship between profit 
and slaughter weight. Figure 4.6 illustrates how break-even fed cattle price and cattle 
weights change throughout the feeding period in the BEEFGAIN simulation. 
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The no-discount in figure 4.5 illustrates how profits are affected by cost of gain 
changes as cattle weights increase. The effect of actual cost of gain changes is fairly 
minor over the range of weights from 1,100 to 1,175 pounds; however, the decrease in 
profits becomes relatively large at extreme weights. 
The profit curve constructed using serial slaughter data and market discounts 
illustrates how feeding profits and slaughter weights are related in the actual fed cattle 
market. The addition of price discounts dramatically alters the consequences ofunder-
or over-finishing cattle. In this illustration, maximum profit occurs at 1,150 pounds. 
Deviations from that weight result in very large reductions in profit. Of course, the rate 
at which profits decrease will depend upon the amount of the price discounts which, as 
noted earlier, depend upon market conditions. Still, price discounts will significantly 
reduce feeding profits for under~ or over-finished cattle-compounding the negative 
impact on profits of cost of gain increases. 
The third curve in figure 4.5 illustrates how profits in the FCMS are affected by 
slaughter weight. The basic shape of the curve corresponds very closely to that of the 
market-based curve; however, it is slightly compressed. That is, the decline in profits 
occurs over a narrower range of slaughter weights. The FCMS curve is also somewhat 
different in that a greater portion of the profit decrease is due to cost of gain effects than 
in the market-based curve. Nevertheless, a comparison of the two curves confirms that 
the FCMS is a good approximation of reality with respect to the issue of slaughter weight 
effects on feeding profits. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Experimental simulation was used to determine the effects of non-price coordination on 
industry-level profits and inefficiency costs in the fed cattle market. Results indicate that 
large gains in industry-level profit can be made using relatively simple non-price 
coordination strategies. All but one of the non-price coordination strategies increased 
industry profits substantially. This increase in profits was due both to cost reductions and 
to boxed beef price increases. 
Simulation results also give some insight into why non-price coordination has not 
been widely adopted in the cattle market. In this study, packers and feeders would favor 
vastly different strategies. Packers would favor strategy I-always slaughter 40 pens-
because this strategy resulted in the lowest processing costs. Total industry losses 
incurred under this strategy were due to higher cost of gain and higher price discounts. 
Assuming that packers could and would pass these high price discounts back to feeders in 
the form of lower bids for fed cattle, packers could avoid almost all of the increased costs 
associated with this strategy. At the same time, they would benefit from being able to 
sell a much greater volume of boxed beef. Feeders, on the other hand, would clearly 
favor strategy three-sell one-third of the 1,125 pound cattle each week, and sell the 
remaining two-thirds of the group the following week at 1,150 pounds. This strategy 
resulted in the lowest cost of gain by avoiding the feeding inefficiencies which result 
from over-finishing cattle. Not surprisingly, neither of these strategies was optimal in 
terms of maximizing industry-level profits, though strategy 3 was much closer to optimal 
than strategy 1. 
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These results of the simulation confirm the conventional wisdom in the feeding 
industry that feedlots need to keep their marketings current, that is, to avoid holding 
cattle in feedlots to heavy weights. Furthermore, this simulation illustrates why feedlot 
managers sometimes find it hard to keep marketings current, that is, packers have an 
incentive to keep showlists full to make it much easier for them to maintain a consistent, 
efficient flow of cattle through their plants. In reality-as in the simulations presented 
here-packers benefit from marketing strategies which result in high volumes of heavy 
cattle while feedlots benefit from strategies which result in relatively low volumes of 
light cattle. 
To summarize, simulation results indicate that substantial gains in industry profit 
could result from the use of non-price coordination in the fed cattle market. Achieving 
these higher profits will require an unprecedented degree of cooperation between feeders 
and packers. The reason for this is that coordination strategies which raise industry-level 
profits are not optimal for packers from a cost minimizing perspective. Because gains in 
industry-level profits far exceed the increase in processing costs, it is possible that a 
redistribution of profits could be achieved which would adequately compensate packers 
for their higher costs. Due to the market power of packers, it seems likely that they 
would, in fact, receive the lion's share of any profit increases. A more thorough 
examination of how profits are divided in the FCMS is needed; however, that issue is 




Table 4.1. Carcass Characteristics and Price Discounts in the FCMS 
Percent 
Slaughter Percent Select Percent YG4 or 5 Light/Heavy 
Weight Select Discount >YG3 Discount Carcasses 
1200 25.0 5.00 8.00 10.00 10.0 
1175 29.0 5.00 6.33 10.00 5.0 
1150 33.0 5.00 4.66 10.00 0.0 
1125 37.0 5.00 3.00 10.00 5.0 
1100 41.0 5.00 1.37 10.00 10.0 
Note: All discounts are given in $/cwt. 
Light/Heavy Total Dressing 
Discount Discount Percentage 
2.00 -2.25 64.0 
2.00 -2.18 63.5 
2~00 -2.12 63.0 
2.00 -2.25 62.5 
2.00 -2.39 62.0 
Table 4.2. Processing Costs per Head for FCMS Packing Plants 
Pens Packing Plant Number 
Processed/Week 1 2 3 4 
1 332.52 329.09 324.10 322.00 
2 181.68 178.26 173.26 171.40 
3 131.41 127.98 122.98 121.12 
4 106.27 102.84 109.58 111.83 
5 87.95 91.93 98.45 101.44 
6 77.56 81.29 88.48 91.93 
7 70.91 73.20 79.86 83.46 
8 68.56 68.06 72.80 76.18 
9 71.10 66.27 67.51 70.25 
10 79.10 68.19 64.19 65.83 
11 93.13 74.20 63.03 63.06 
12 100.00 84.80 64.25 62.10 
13 100.00 100.00 68.05 63.11 
14 100.00 100.00 74.63 66.24 
15 100.00 100.00 84.20 71.64 
16 100.00 100.00 96.95 79.47 
17 100.00 100.00 100.00 89.88 
18 100.00 ·100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 4.3. Summary of Results of Simulation of Non-price Coordination 
in theFCMS 
Strategy No Coordination 1 2 3 4 5 
No. of Pens Sold 2,639 2,742 2,630 2,628 2,590 2,576 
Ave. Sale Weight (cwt.) 11.57 11.59 11.50 11.42 11.45 11.43 
Boxed Beef Yield/hd. (cwt.) 7.31 7.33 7.25 7.17 7.21 7.19 
Boxed Beef Sold ( mil. cwt) 1.93 2.01 1.91 1.89 1.87 1.85 
Ave. Boxed Beef Price 123.05 119.56 · 123.73 124.50 125.73 126.30 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Boxed Beef Rev. (mil.) 237.35 240.14 235.76 234.73 234.67 233.77 
By-product Rev. (mil.) 25.96 27.01 25.71 25.50 25.22 25.03 
Total Discounts (mil.) 4.43 6.65 4.04 4.08 4.01 3.99 
Net Revenue (mil.) 258.88 260.51 257.43 256.16 255.87 254.81 
Total Feeder Cost (mil.) 180.53 187.78 179.86 179.82 177.22 176.30 
Total C.O.G. (mil.) 57.24 62.03 53.94 52.90 52.67 51.96 
Total Processing Cost (mil.) 17. 99 17.84 17.72 17.67 17.11 17.04 
Total Profit (mil.) 3.12 (7.15) 5.90 5.76 8.88 9.51 
Note: Coordination strategies 1 through 5 are as follows: 
1) Sell 40 pens/week when available. 
2) Sell all cattle at 1, 150 pounds. 
3) Sell 1/3 of the 1,125 each week and the remaining cattle at 1,150 pounds the next week. 
4) Sell 40 pens or less at weights between 1,125 and 1,175 pounds. · 
5) Sell 40 pens or less at 1, 150 pounds or less. 
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Table 4.4. Summary of Simulation Results on Per Head and Per Hundred-weight of 
Boxed Beef Basis 
Strategy No Coordination 1 2 3 4 5 
Boxed BeefRev./hd. 899.41 875.79 896.43 893.19 906.05 907.50 
By-product Rev./hd. 98.37 98.51 97.75 97.05 97.37 97.16 
Discounts/hd. 16.80 24.24 15.36 15.51 15.48 15.49 
Net Rev./hd. 980.98 950.06 978.82 974.72 987.93 989.17 
Feeder Cost/hd. 684.07 684.84 683.89 684.23 684.24 684.40 
C.O.G./hd. 216.92 226.23 205.11 201.31 203.36 201.72 
Processing Cost/hd. 68.18 65.06 67.38 67.25 66.06 66.15 
Profit/hd. 11.81 (26.06) 22.44 21.93 34.28 36.91 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Boxed Beef Rev./ 
cwt. boxed beef 123.05 119.56 123.73 124.50 125.73 126.30 
By-Product Rev./ 
cwt. boxed beef 13.46 13.45 13.49 13.53 13.51 13.52 
Discounts/cwt. boxed beef 2:30 3.31 2.12 2.16 2.15 2.16 
Net Rev./cwt. boxed beef 134.21 129.70 135.10 135.86 137.09 137.67 
Feeder Cost/cwt. 
boxed beef 93.59 93.49 94.40 95.37 94.95 95.25 
C.O.G./cwt. boxed beef 29.68 30.88 28.31 28.06 28.22 28.07 
Processing Cost/ 
cwt. boxed beef 9.33 8.88 9.30 9.37 9.17 9.21 
Profit/cwt. boxed beef 1.62 (3.56) 3.10 3.06 4.76 5.14 
Note: Coordination strategies 1 through 5 are as follows: 
1) Sell 40 pens/week when available. 
2) Sell all cattle at I, 150 pounds. 
3) Sell 1/3 of the 1,125 each week and the remaining cattle at 1,150 pounds the next week. 
4) Sell 40 pens or less at weights between 1,125 and 1,175 pounds. 
5) Sell 40 pens or less at 1,150 pounds or less. 
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Table 4.5. Market-Based Fed Cattle Price Discounts and Serial Slaughter Carcass 
Characteristics Used in BEEFGAIN Simulation 
%Light %Heavy Dressing 
Weight Group % Select %YG4 Carcassesa Carcassesb Percentage 
1,075 52.46 0.78 1.587 . 0.000 64.15 
1,100 45.88 0.39 0.794 0.000 64.53 
1,125 39.29 0.00 0.000 0.000 64.90 
1,150 35.27 1.02 0.000 0.000 64.68 
1,175 31.25 2.03 0.000 0.000 67.52 
1,200 28.97 3.79 0.000 0.782 64.83 
1,225 26.69 5.54 0.00 1.563 65.20 
Discountsc $7/cwt $15/cwt $25/cwt $10/cwt 
a Light carcasses are those weighing less than 550 pounds. 
b Heavy carcasses are those weighing over 950 pounds. 
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Figure 4.2 Boxed beef demand schedule used in FCMS 
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The preceding studies have addressed some important issues related to 
management, policy, and marketing in the cattle feeding industry. All of these studies 
have identified potential or existing inefficiencies which could, or in fact do, result in the 
misallocation of productive resources. The major findings of each article will be 
recapitulated here. 
The Feeder Cattle/Corn Price Relationship 
In "The Dynamics of Feeder Cattle Market Responses to Corn Price Change," it was 
shown that popular estimates of the impact of corn price changes on feeder cattle prices 
were inaccurate in two respects. First, commonly reported corn price multipliers are 
generally too low; that is, they underestimate the amount by which a given corn price 
increase (decrease) will decrease (increase) feeder cattle prices. Second, these corn price 
multipliers imply that the relationship between corn and feeder cattle prices is constant. 
This study shows that that is not true. That relationship will change as the values of 
technical parameters related to the feeding process change. These technical parameters 
themselves will adjust in response to corn price changes. 
The recursive system of equations developed here emphasizes the fact that a 
ceteris paribus explanation of corn price effects on feeder cattle prices is inaccurate and 
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misleading. Com price changes result in changes to the entire feeding system-in other 
words, not only feeder prices but also production practices will adjust as com prices 
change. These system changes are reflected in the new feeder price. The use of a 
recursive system of equations derived from break-even budgeting theory and 
incorporating information on·the physical characteristics of cattle on feed is unique in the 
literature. This method resulted in a model with greatly improved statistical properties 
when compared to previous econometric models of feeder cattle prices. 
Public Information and Price Discovery 
Results of the research presented in "Experimental Simulation of Public Information 
Impacts on Price Discovery and Marketing Efficiency in the Fed Cattle Market" indicate 
that a reduction in public information would lead to greater variability of fed cattle 
prices. No definite price level effects from reducing public information could be 
determined. In addition, this study found that reduced public information resulted in 
inefficient resource allocation as cattle were fed to higher average weights which resulted 
in reduced profits due to increases in feed costs and price discounts associated with the 
undesirable characteristics of heavy carcasses. 
Data used in this study were obtained from a controlled experiment using the Fed 
Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS). The use of experimentation to examine an economic 
issue makes this study unique. Also uncommon is the fact that this paper addresses the 
cash market impacts of public price and quantity information. Most studies of the market 
impacts of information have focused instead upon the futures market impacts of 
government production or inventory reports. 
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Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle Market 
In the final study, "Estimated Value of Non-price Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle 
Market," the employment of relatively simple, non-price vertical coordination strategies 
was shown to greatly increase industry-level profits in the Fed Cattle Market Simulator 
(FCMS). This increase in profits was due primarily to higher revenue from boxed beef 
sales and lower costs of gain for cattle on feed. Coordination strategies which kept 
feedlot marketings current (in other words, strategies which avoided feeding cattle to 
heavy weights) resulted in the highest industry-level profits. These results confirm the 
conventional wisdom of cattle feeders that it is best not to allow cattle to get "backed up" 
in the feedlot. Interestingly, simulations provided some insight as to why feedlots have a 
difficult time keeping marketings current: packers find it easier to obtaining their least-
cost volume of fed cattle when feedlots are full, that is, when feedlot marketings are 
backed up. This inherent conflict between. optimal strategies on opposite sides of the 
market represents a significant barrier to achieving the level of cooperation necessary to 
implement non-price vertical coordination in a non-integrated industry. 
This study represents a preliminary effort to provide quantitative estimates of the 
potential effects of vertical coordination in an agricultural market. Much work on the 
theoretical justification and motivation for vertical coordination through non-price means 
has been presented in economic literature for over four decades. Little quantitative work 
has been done, however. This research thus represents a valuable addition to the already 
extensive vertical coordination literature. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
With respect to the first article, more research needs to be done on the role that substitute 
grains might play in the relationship between com and cattle prices. Appendix B begins 
to address that issue by examining the relationship between com price and cost of gain. 
Based on that research, the effect of substitute grains on the com/feeder price 
relationship appears to be minor over a wide range of com prices; however, at extremely 
high corn prices---over $4/bu-the effect may become substantial. 
In addition, more work should be done on the impact of corn price changes on the 
stocker cattle and cow/calf sectors of the beef industry. Changes in production practices 
within these sectors, particularly the stocker sector, fulfill an important role in allocating 
resources-specifically grains--across alternative uses. Parsons provides a conceptual 
framework for analysis of this resource allocation role of the stocker sector; however, 
more empirical work needs to be done. 
With respect to the second article, more research is needed on the possible price 
level effects of reductions in public information. Sound theoretical arguments can be 
made for either positive or negative effects. Results presented here are ambiguous as to 
which direction price level effects may run, if in fact they occur at all. 
Finally, with respect to the third article, further research is needed to determine 
how industry-level profits are divided between fed cattle market participants. This 
research addressed the issue of how the level of industry-level profits is affected by non-
price coordination; however, no conclusions could be drawn about how the market would 
split those profits. Undoubtedly, market power will play an important role in 
determining the division of profits. However, in the fed cattle market, the dynamics of 
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production should be expected to result in market power shifting from one side of the 
market to the other. When cattle are scarce feedlots have tremendous bargaining power~ 
however, when cattle are plentiful, packers have the advantage. This rather unique 
situation presents an interesting problem which is worthy of further inquiry. 
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Appendix A 
The break-even budget of table 2.1 was also used to examine the possibility that 
the change in feeder cattle price reporting practices at the Oklahoma City auction could 
have contributed to model instability. Prior to 1992, the high and low price range for 100 
pound weight ranges was reported. Starting in 1992, the "true" average price over a 50 
pound weight range was reported. 
The reason that parameter instability could possible result from the change in 
price reporting practices is clearly illustrated with output from break-even budgeting. 
Using the budgeting procedures developed in table 2.1, a graph of feeder calf prices 
against weight can be developed. Under most price scenarios, the curve will be 
downward sloping. The slope of the curve is determined by the price of com. If the 
price of com is high, feeding light calves will be relatively more expensive, so the 
premium for them will be reduced. It is even possible that the curve could be upward 
sloping, indicating that a pound of gain costs more than it is worth. Figures A. l and A.2 
illustrate respectively the impact of com prices on the slope of the feeder calf price curve 
and the effect oflive cattle prices on the curve. It can also be noted in figure A.2 that the 
level of the curve is changed by live cattle price changes but that the slope is fairly 
constant with regard to live cattle price changes. 
The shape of these curves was very important to determining the impact of the 
change in the feeder cattle price reporting system in 1992. Prior to 1992, a price range 
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was reported for each weight group. The high price presumably was usually set by high 
quality cattle in the lower end of the weight range while the low price was set by low 
quality cattle in the high end of the weight range. A common practice is to average the 
two prices to determine the "average" price at the midpoint of the range. 
An average over any given weight range can be represented graphically as a line 
between points on the curve. Because the curves are convex to the origin, such a line 
connecting any two points on the curve will lie above the actual curve. The greater the 
range over which prices are averaged, the further above the actual curve the connecting 
line will lie. What this means is that the calculated average prices over any weight range 
is a source of upward bias when only the high and low price are reported. Furthermore, 
the degree to which prices are biased is influenced by the length of the weight range for 
which the prices are averaged. However, starting in 1992, price reporters reported the 
price of all cattle sold in a given weight range and reported a "true" average price over 
each weight range. 
The possibility that reporting true prices over shorter weight ranges beginning in 
1992 may have reduced the upward bias in the feeder calf price series was examined with 
the break-even budget. Using break-even calculations, a series of hypothetical feeder 
calf prices was generated for a series of weights between 700 and 800 pounds using one-
quarter pound intervals. A separate price series was generated for each com price 
between $1.25/bu and $3.50/bu at $0.05 intervals. A true average using every price in 
each series was then compared with an average of the two prices at the endpoints of each 
series. This endpoint average corresponds to the reported feeder cattle price using the 
100 pound weight interval. Subtracting the true average from the endpoint average 
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resulted in an estimate of the amount of bias in the 1985-1991 feeder calf price series. 
As expected the level of bias was highest at low corn prices; however, the bias was 
generally much less than $0.01/lb. 
The hypothetical bias estimates were regressed against corn prices to obtain an 
equation for estimating bias. Results of that regression are presented in table A 1. This 
equation was then used to adjust downward the reported feeder calf prices from 1985-
1991. A partial adjustment model of feeder calf prices using corn and live cattle prices 
as explanatory variables was then estimated. This model was first estimated using the 
unadjusted feeder calf price series and then re-estimated using the adjusted feeder calf 
price series. Parameter stability was not significantly improved by the use of adjusted 
prices, leading to the conclusion that the change in price reporting practices beginning in 
1992 was not a significant source of parameter instability. Parameter instability that was 
present in the original model was later determined to be primarily due to changes in the 
technical feeding parameters. Specification of the break-even model as developed in 
chapter II corrected this problem. 
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Note: Single asterisks denote significance at the O.Ol level. 
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Standard Error 
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Note: Fed cattle price in these break-even calculations is $0.65/lb. 
Figure A.1 Comparison of break-even feeder cattle prices at different corn prices 
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Cost of gain is an important part of break-even budget calculations. Though 
cost of gain includes feeding-related expenses such as yardage fees, veterinary charges, 
and interest, by far its largest component is feed costs. Given that the com is, by volume, 
the most important ingredient in feedlot rations, it is not surprising that cost of gain is 
closely related to com price. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that producers also use com price as a proxy for 
feed costs in their break-even calculations. There is little doubt that, for the most part, 
using com price as a measure of feed costs in cost of gain calculations is an acceptable 
practice; however, if com prices are sufficiently high, it is possible that the relationship 
between com price and cost of gain could be altered. Changes in the relationship 
between com price and cost of gain could arise for three reasons. First, substitution of 
relatively cheaper grains for com may be an option for feedlot managers. Second, 
changes occurring in placement and slaughter weights of cattle in response to high com 
prices can affect feed conversion rate -- another important element in determining cost of 
gain. Third, if feedlots maintain inventories of com or if they forward contract some of 
their com purchases, cost of gain will not be as responsive to com price as budgeting 
assumes. The purpose of this research is to determine the relationship between com 
prices and cost of gain. If substitution in feed rations, cattle weight adjustments, and 
forward contracting and inventories of com affect the relationship between com price 
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and cost of gain, then the standard budgeting practice of using corn price as a proxy for 
feed cost will lead to inaccurate break-even estimates. The inaccuracy of the estimates 
would presumably be greater the higher the corn price. Since cattle feeders rely on 
break-even estimates in making purchasing decisions and formulating marketing 
strategies, it is important for them to know if these estimates are accurate. Results of this 
study will indicate whether using corn price alone in break-even budgets yields reliable 
results or if a more comprehensive measure of rations costs is needed. 
Theoretical Considerations 
Though the mathematics of break-even calculations is quite simple, deciding which 
parameter values to use can be more difficult. If budgeting is to be at all useful in 
decision-making, some of the parameter values must be estimated. Feeder cattle prices 
and placement weights are, of course, observable at the time the decision to place cattle 
on feed is made; however, fed cattle prices, slaughter weight, and cost of gain must be 
estimated. The accuracy of budget calculations-and hence the quality of decisions 
based thereon-depends upon the accuracy of these estimates. 
Slaughter weights for feedlot cattle are related to placement weights. This is 
due to the fact that a certain amount of gain from grain feeding is required if cattle are to 
grade choice; therefore, a good expectation of slaughter weight can be made by observing 
whether placement weight is relatively heavy or relatively light. Generally, heavy 
placement weights correspond to heavy slaughter weights, and light placement weights 
correspond to light slaughter weights. 
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For fed cattle price expectations, live cattle futures prices are available. Accurate 
cost of gain estimation presents something of a problem, however. Cost of gain is a 
measure of the cost incurred in adding one pound to the weight of the animal. As noted, 
the largest component of cost of gain is the feed costs. In addition, feed conversion 
rate-the number of pounds of feed required to achieve a pound of gain-has an 
important impact on cost of gain. 
From a budgeting standpoint, estimating cost of gain is difficult because ration 
cost and feed conversion rate are not known at the time feeding decisions must be made. 
The practice of using corn price as a proxy for ration cost has been noted. When corn 
prices are high, this simplification may lead to errors in budget estimates because at high 
corn prices, it may be cost-effective to substitute other grains (e.g., wheat) for corn in 
ration formulation. Least-cost ration programs allow for this possibility. While these 
least-cost ration programs are useful to feedlot managers for making short-run decisions 
about ration composition given that feed ingredients have already been purchased, they 
are considerably less useful to cattle feeders who must make their decisions further in 
advance. 
In addition to substitution of other grains, higher corn prices may lead to 
changes in the characteristics of cattle entering feedlots. Presumably, cattle will be 
placed on feed at heavier weights and slaughtered at lighter weights. As mentioned 
earlier, there is a limit to how much cattle weights can be manipulated, but some amount 
of adjustment is possible. Finally, given that feedlots maintain some inventories of corn 
and forward contract corn purchases, the relationship between current corn price and cost 
of gain will not be as strong as budgets assume. 
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It is hypothesized that at high com prices, the net effect of the actions of cattle 
feeders will lead to a reduction in the use of com. Consequently, cost of gain will be less 
responsive to com price at high com price levels. This hypothesis is based on the theory 
that when a factor price increases, maintaining optimal ( cost-minimizing) production 
requires that adjustments be made to reduce the use of that factor. Implicit in the use of 
com price as a proxy for feed cost in cost of gain calculations is the assumption that there 
is a one-to-one relationship between com price and cost of gain. That is, a 1 % increase 
(decrease) in the price of com results in a 1 % increase (decrease) in cost of gain. Thus, 
using com price alone could overstate cost of gain at high com prices. 
Data and Procedures 
Data for this experiment were obtained from Professional Cattle Consultants (PCC), a 
feedlot consulting firm in Weatherford, OK. The data used in the experiment included 
monthly average feed conversion rate and cost of gain for all pens of cattle slaughtered in 
a given month and average com price paid by feedlots in each month. PCC data do not 
give cost of gain and feed conversion rates for all pens of cattle each month. Rather, the 
data give average cost of gain and feed conversion rates for the pens slaughtered in a 
given month. These values are therefore determined over the entire feeding period, not 
each month. Data cover the period from 1980 through 1996. 
The hypothesis motivating this research is that cost of gain will not increase 
with com prices at a one-to-one rate. More specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
elasticity of the cost of gain with respect to com price will be less than one, the elasticity 
assumed in the budgeting process. In addition, it is hypothesized to be possible that cost 
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of gain will increase at a decreasing rate as com prices rise. This suggests that cost of 
gain should be represented as a quadratic function of com prices. Alternatively, cost of 
gain may increase at a constant rate with com price but at a rate that is lower than the 
rate of increase in com price. Conceptually, this would result in a functional relationship 
between com price and cost of gain in which the slope parameter on com price has a 
magnitude that would result in an elasticity of less than one; that is, a 1 % increase in com 
price would result in less than a 1 % increase in the cost of gain. Due to the importance 
of feed conversion in determining cost of gain, it should also be included in the model. 
The estimated model will therefore take the following form: 
(1) COG= f(CORN, CORN, CONV, DJ, ... , Dl2, TIME), 
where COG is cost of gain per pound; CORN is the com price/bu; CONV is the feed 
conversion rate; D 1, ... , D 12 are· monthly dummy variables to account for the seasonality 
of cost of gain; and TIME is a linear time trend variable. 
Because in the PCC data, cost of gain is determined for the entire feeding period 
and not simply monthly, it would be inaccurate to match each cost of gain entry with a 
single com price. For this reason, the com price used must be an average for the feeding 
period. A four-month moving average is used to represent com price for the entire period 
on feed. Since days on feed varies for each observation, a more accurate procedure would 
be to base the length of average on the actual days on feed; however, the monthly com 
prices available from PCC do not really allow for this level of precision. 
The four-month moving average is lagged one month from the current month to 
reflect the fact that com purchases are made, at least to some degree, in advance. Using 
com price from the same month which cattle are slaughtered would overstate the 
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importance of that current com price, particularly for cost of gain of cattle slaughtered 
earlier in the month. To illustrate the application of the moving average price, if the 
slaughter month is May, cost of gain is taken to be a function of com prices in January, 
February, March, and April. Feed conversion and cost of gain observations correspond 
with one another so no adjustment is necessary. 
Due to the data observation periods overlapping for cost of gain and feed 
conversion, autocorrelation was expected to be a problem. Because cost of gain and feed 
conversion are calculated over the whole feeding period, observations on these variables 
for one month will be related to observations from a number of previous months, the 
exact number depending on the length of time on feed. This structural peculiarity of the 
data was expected to be reflected in moving average errors. 
If cost of gain is, in fact, concave in com prices as hypothesized, this fact will be 
reflected by the signs of the coefficients. The sign on the linear com price term should 
be positive while the sign on the coefficient on the quadratic com price should be 
negative. If, on the other hand, the relationship is linear, the coefficient on the quadratic 
com price should be not significant; however, according to the hypothesis stated earlier, 
the coefficient on the linear com price should be of a magnitude that would result in an 
elasticity of less than one. In either case, the use of com price as an estimate of feed 
costs in break-even budgets will lead to an overestimation of cost of gain. The degree to 
which estimates will be erroneous will depend upon the magnitude of the com price 
coefficients. If the coefficient on squared com price is not significant and if the linear 
slope parameter results in an elasticity which is close to one, then using com price alone 
in break-even estimates should not result in substantial errors. A positive sign is 
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expected on feed conversion rate because cost of gain will increase as more feed is 
required to achieve a pound of gain. 
Modeling Results 
Misspecification tests revealed significant autocorrelation in the model·estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). An autoregressive model was estimated to correct for first-
degree autocorrelation. The model was re-estimated using maximum likelihood 
· estimation (MLE). MLE was considered appropriate since the distribution of the error 
terms was shown to be not significantly different from normal by a Jarque-Bera test. 
Tests of the residuals showed that the autocorrelation present in the OLS model 
had been corrected in the autoregressive model. The coefficient on the quadratic com 
price was not significantly different from zero. In addition, its sign was reversed. The 
non-significant quadratic term was dropped and the model re-estimated. Results of the 
model without the quadratic term are given in table B.1. The lack of significance on the 
quadratic com price term indicates that cost of gain increases at a constant rate with com 
price; however, as hypothesized there is not a one-to-one correspondence between com 
price and cost of gain changes. The coefficient on feed conversion is positive, as 
expected. 
Using the parameter estimates from the model in table B.1 along with the means 
of com price and cost of gain, the elasticity of cost of gain with respect to com price can 
be calculated: 
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(2) model~ = aCOG • CORN 0.0992•(2.839/0.531)=0.530. 
'=>cog 8CORN COG 
Using the estimated standard error of the com price coefficient (0.0032), the standard 
error of the elasticity of cost of gain with respect to com price can be calculated as 
follows: 
(3) s.e. model ~og = [(2.839/0.531)2 • (0.0032)2] 112 = 0.017. 
The preceding calculations show that the elasticity of the cost of gain model is 
significantly smaller than one, as budgeting assumes. This indicates that cost of gain will 
be considerably less responsive to changes in com price than break-even analysis 
indicates. This can lead to quite large differences in cost of gain estimates. This point is 
illustrated in figure B.1, which shows the model cost of gain function as well as a unit-
elastic cost of gain function plotted against com price. The difference between these 
functions is plotted as well. The unit-elastic cost of gain function is constructed so that 
the average cost of gain from the data series used in the modeling ($0.531/lb) 
corresponds to the average com price ($2.839/bu). 
As com price increases, the difference between the unit elastic cost of gain 
estimates and model estimates becomes larger due to the difference in elasticities. This 
is clear from table B.2, which shows some of the values used in constructing figure B.1. 
Using com price and cost of gain difference information in table B.2, it is possible to 
calculate an equation for the line describing the difference function in figure B.1. This is 
given below: 
(4) cogb.e. - co&nodel = {(0.1357 + 0.0400)/(4-2)}(com price- 3) + 0.0478. 
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This is just the equation of a line whose slope is given by the term in brackets on the right 
side of the equation. 
Interestingly, at average com prices (around 2.50/bu), the two different estimates 
of cost of gain are very close to one another-within less than $0.01/lb. However, the 
two estimates diverge rapidly as com prices become extreme. Note that at low com 
price, model cost of gain estimates exceed the budget estimates. This is due to the fact 
that the model incorporates actual cost of gain figures which include non-feed items such 
as yardage, veterinary expense, and interest. On the other hand, at high com prices, the 
budget cost of gain is substantially larger than the model cost of gain-by nearly $0.10/lb 
at a com price of 3.50/bu and by nearly $0.14/lb at a com price of 4.00/bu. 
The cost of gain difference equation ( 4) quantifies the discrepancy between 
break-even estimates of cost of gain and actual cost of gain values. This equation thus 
provides a valuable tool to cattle feeders who need to be able to accurately estimate the 
cost of gain which they should expect cattle being placed on feed to incur. This equation 
therefore has very practical farm management applications. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to determine if the practice of using com price as a 
substitute for ration cost in break-even calculations is justified. It was hypothesized that 
adjustments made in response to high com prices would alter both ration composition 
and cattle weights. The combined effect of these adjustments on ration cost and feed 
conversion was expected to be reflected cost of gain function which did not increase at a 
one-to-one rate with com prices. Results of the cost of gain model presented here 
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provide support for this hypothesis. Cost of gain was estimated to be a linear function of 
com price. The responsiveness of cost of gain was shown to be less than that implied by 
break-even budgets using only com price. 
Using com as a proxy for ration cost in break-even budgeting will, based on the 
results, of this study, exaggerate the impact of com price changes on cost of gain, though 
not by as much as if the cost of gain function were quadratic. The amount of discrepancy 
between break-even and model cost of gain estimates is quantified in a linear function of 
com price. This functional relationship will allow cattle feeders to achieve a higher level 
of precision in using break-even budgets as management/decision-making tools. 
The results of this study would seem to have important practical application~ 
however, two caveats to the interpretation of these results are in order. First, data used in 
this study were highly aggregated. As noted, these data were compiled from feedlots all 
over the nation. At a local or even regional level, the availability of substitutes may be a 
bigger factor relating com price to cost of gain than the aggregate data suggest. For 
example, cost of gain at a feedlot with access to milo or brewer's grain or com gluten 
may not show the same relationship to com price as at a feedlot without such access. 
Second, relatively few high com prices were observed in the period ofthis study. 
At sufficiently high com prices (over $4/bu), the quadratic relationship hypothesized 
earlier may actually hold. Perhaps too few observations at such high com prices were 
available for this effect to be captured in the regressions. It is also possible that the linear 
relationship holds until com prices reach a certain critical level. Beyond this level, the 
relationship between cost of gain and com price may change. This suggests that a spline 
function may describe the relationship between cost of gain and com price more 
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accurately than a continuous function of the variety discussed here. More research is 
needed to determine if this is actually the case, and if so, at what critical com price the 
kink in the function occurs. 
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Table B.1. Parameter Estimates from Autoregressive Model of Cost of Gain 
Independent Estimated T-Ratio 
Variable Coefficient 184 d.f 
CORN 0.0992 30.60 
CONV 0.0653 18.21 
TIME 0.0004 9.59 
D2 0.0035 2..31 
D3 0.0028 1.44 
D4 0.0022 1.00 
D5 -0.0027 -1.06 
D6 -0.0069 -2.28 
D7 -0.0135 -4.03 
D8 -0.0163 -4.95 
D9 -0.0137 -4.46 
D10 -0.0104 -3.68 
Dll -0.0051 -2.12 
D12 -0.0033 -1.98 
AR(l) -0.8338 20.65 
Constant -0.2190 -7.82 
Note: Coefficients were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Figure B.1 Break-even and model cost of gain vs. corn price 
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Appendix C 
During the experiment for determining the value of public information, each time 
the amount of available information was changed students were given a survey which 
asked them to rate on a .scale of 1 to 10 how important the various amounts and types of 
information were to them in making marketing decisions. They were also asked how 
much they would be willing to pay for the various amounts and types of information. In 
addition, they were asked to rate the importance of futures market information, which 
was available through all information periods. Finally, they were asked to discuss how 
they compensated for the loss of information. Copies of the surveys used in the 
experiment are given in Appendix D. 
Analy~is of Variance (AOV) was conducted on this survey information to assess 
any differences that might exist between feeders and packers in their attitudes toward and 
willingness to pay for information. Two significant results were obtained. 
First, packers placed significantly less importance on futures market information 
than did feeders. This is probably due to the fact that in the Fed Cattle Market Simulator 
(FCMS), packers' profit/loss statements allow them to determine boxed-beef price. They 
would therefore have less incentive than feeders to use the futures market as a substitute 
for summary information. 
Second, packers indicated that they were significantly less willing than feeders to 
pay to have various types and amounts of information maintained or restored. They 
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apparently felt more comfortable with their ability to adjust to or compensate for lost 
information than did feeders. 
Participant responses to the question of how they compensated for the loss of 
information clearly indicate that they missed the withheld information. Responses also 
indicate a decline in the quality of decision-making due to the loss of information. 
Common strategies for dealing with limited information included the following: 
greater reliance on feeders visiting with other feeders, packers with other packers; 
more reliance on costs and break-even prices as a basis for price discovery rather 
than market price signals; 
increased use of previous profit and loss experiences as a basis for price 
discovery; 
increased use of futures market prices; and 
much more guessing. 
Clearly, market participants made less-informed decisions, used whatever 
information could be found, and make more "same as last time" decisions when market 
information was limited. It is somewhat surprising that only one firm noted that it 
increased its use of contracts without public market information. This is a logical 
response and one that may have become more prevalent had the length of the limited 
information periods been longer. 
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Appendix D 
PACKER-FEEDER VALUE OF INFORMATION SURVEY 
Full Information 
Your Packer Number or Feedlot Number ------ -------
During the past 4 trading periods, you have participated in the packer-feeder game with 
"full information". We define full information as: (1) within-week current-market 
information (the cash market light bar); and (2) end-of-week market-summary 
information (the chalk board). You also had access to futures market information. 
Answer the following questions individually, not as a team. 
1. How important was full information ( cash market light bar and chalk board) to 
pricing and marketing/purchasing decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant 
during the past four weeks? Indicate the importance of full information ( cash 
market light bar and chalk board) to you on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not 
important and 10 means very important. ___ _ 
2. Futures market information is not a direct part of our experiment, but we are 
interested in your opinion as to its importance. How important was futures 
market information (the futures market light bar) to pricing and 
marketing/purchasing decision-making for your feedlot/packing plant during the 
past four weeks? Indicate the important of the futures market light bar 
information to you on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 
means very important. ____ _ 
3. How much did full information (cash market light bar and chalk board) contribute 
to the profitability of your feedlot/packing plant during the past four weeks? 
(Note: If you experienced losses rather than profits, think in terms of how much 
worse your losses would have been without the information.) Indicate the 
contribution full information ( cash market light bar and chalk board) made to your 
profits per head. 
$ /head in game dollars. 
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4. How much would you be willing to pay (for example, to a news serve) to 
maintain full information ( cash market light bar and chalk board)? Indicate the 
amount you would be willing to pay. $ /head in game dollars. 
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PACKER-FEEDER VALUE OF INFORMATION SURVEY 
Limited Information: Within-Week 
Your Packer Number or Feedlot Number ~-- -~~~~-
Answer the following questions individually, not as a team. 
During the past 8 trading periods, you have participated in the packer-feeder game with 
"limited information". Limited information here means operating without the within-
week current-market information (the cash market light bar). 
1. How important was the cash market light bar information . to pncmg and 
marketing/purchasing decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant during the 
past eight weeks? Indicate the importance of the cash market light bar 
information to you on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 
means very important. ____ _ 
2. Without the cash market light bar information, how important was futures market 
information (the futures market light bar) to pricing and marketing/purchasing 
decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant during the past eight weeks? 
Indicate the importance· of the futures market light bar information to you on a 
scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 means very important. 
3. How much did the cash market light bar information contribute to the profitability 
of your feedlot-packing plant? (Note: If you experienced losses rather than 
profits, think in terms of how much worse your losses would have been without 
the information.) Indicate the contribution the cash market light bar information 
made to profit per head. $ /head in game dollars. 
4. How much would you be willing to pay (for example, to a news service) to restore 
the cash market light bar information? Indicate the amount you would be willing 
to pay. $ /head in game dollars. 
5. What did you do to compensate for the loss of the cash market light bar 
information during the past eight weeks? _____________ _ 
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PACKER-FEEDER VALUE OF INFORMATION SURVEY 
Limited Information: End-of-Week 
Your Packer Number or Feedlot Number --- ------
Answer the following questions individually, not as a team. 
During the past 8 trading periods, you have participated in the packer-feeder game with 
"limited information." Limited information here means operating without the end-of-
week market-summary information (the chalk board). 
1. How important was the chalk board information to pncmg and 
marketing/purchasing decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant during the 
past eight weeks? Indicate the importance of the chalk board information to you 
on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 means very important. . 
2. Without the chalk board information, how important was futures market 
information (the futures market light bar) to pricing and marketing/purchasing 
decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant during the past eight weeks? 
Indicate the importance of the futures market light bar information to you on a 
scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 means very important. 
3. How much did the chalk board information contribute to the profitability of your 
feedlot/packing plant the past eight weeks? (Note: If you are experiencing losses 
rather than profits, think in terms of how much worse your losses would have 
been without the information.) Indicate the contribution the chalk board 
information made to profit per head. $ /head in game dollars. 
4. How much would you be willing to pay (for example, to a news service) to restore 
the chalk board information? Indicate the amount you would be willing pay. $ _ 
_____ /head in game dollars. 
5. What did you do to compensate for the loss of the chalk board information during 
the past eight weeks? ____________________ _ 
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PACKER-FEEDER VALUE OF INFORMATION SURVEY 
Limited Information: Within-Week and End-of-Week 
Your Packer Number or Feedlot Number ------ -------
Answer the following questions individually, not as a team. 
Over the past 8 trading periods, you have participated in the packer-feeder game with 
"limited information". Limited information here means operating without the within-
week current-market information (the cash market light bar AND the end-of-week market 
summary information (the chalk board). 
1. How important was the cash market light bar AND the chalk board information to 
pricing and marketing/purchasing decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant 
during the past eight weeks? Indicate the importance of the cash market light bar 
AND chalk board information to you on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not 
important and 10 means very important. ___ _ 
2. Without the cash market light bar AND chalk board information, how important 
was futures market information (the futures market light bar) pricing and 
marketing/purchasing decision-making in your feedlot/packing plant during the 
past eight weeks? Indicate the importance of the futures market light bar 
information to you on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not important and 10 
means very important. ____ _ 
3. How much did the cash market light bar AND chalk board information contribute 
to the profitability of your feedlot/packing plant the past eight weeks? (Note: If 
you experienced losses rather than profits, think in terms of how much worse your 
losses would have been without the information.) Indicate the contribution the 
cash market light bar AND chalk board information made to profit per head. $ _ 
___ /head in game dollars 
4. How much would you be willing to pay ( for example, to a news service) to restore 
the cash market light bar AND chalk board information? Indicate the amount 
you would be willing to pay. $ /head in game dollars. 
5. What did you do to compensate for the loss of the cash market light bar AND 
chalk board information during the past eight weeks? _________ _ 
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Appendix E 
This is the code for the SAS program used to estimate the break-even feeder cattle price 
model of Chapter II: 
data femod; 
infile 'H:\SIM\FCADJ.TXT'; 
input mn month$ feadj e le deaf iwest owest slmn $; 
/*MN=MONTH NUMBER 1 - 132)*/ 
/*MONTH=MONTH CORRESPONDING TO FCADJ*/ 
/*FCADJ=FEEDER CALF PRICE AT T ADJUSTED FOR IWEST*/ 
/*C=CORN PRICE*/ 
/*LC=LIVE CATTLE FUTURES PRICE 140 DAYS OUT*/ 
/*IWEST=EXPECTED AVERAGE IN WEIGHT AT T*/ 
/*OWEST=EXPECTED SLAUGHTER WEIGHT AT T+140*/ 
/*SLMN=SLAUGHTER MONTH*/ 
if month="feb" then d2=1; 
else d2=0; 
if month="mar" then d3=1; 
else d3=0; 
if month="apr" then d4=1; 
else d4=0; 
if month="may" then d5=1; 
else d5=0; 
if month="jun" then d6=1; 
else d6=0; 
if month="jul" then d7=1; 
else d7=0; 
if month="aug" then d8=1; 
else d8=0; 
if month="sep" then d9=1; 
else d9=0; 
if month="oet" then dlO=l; 
else dlO=O; 
if month="nov" then dll=l; 
else dll=O; 
if month="dee" then d12=1; 
else d12=0; 
if slmn="jan" then eonv=6.8164; 
if slmn="feb" then eonv=6.9632; 
if slmn="mar" then eonv=6.9679; 
if slmn="apr" then eonv=6.7729; 
if slmn="may" then eonv=6.5170; 
if slmn="jun" then eonv=6.2855; 
if slmn="jul" then eonv=6.2162; 
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if slrnn="aug" then conv=6.2641; 
if slmn="sep" then conv=6. 3426; 
if slrnn="oct" then conv=6.3537; 
if slrnn="nov" then conv=6.3971; 










var fcadj c le iwest owest conv dcof rev cost; 
proc reg covout outest=fcest; 
model fcadj=lfcadj cost rev dcof cosd sind d2 d3 d4 dS d6 d7 
dB d9 dlO dll dl2; 
output out=paout p=yhat r=ehat; 
season: test d2=d3=d4=d5=d6=d7=dB=d9=dlO=dll=dl2=0; 
cycle: test cosd=sind=O; 
data joint; 
merge fcmod paout; 
perr=ehat/fcadj; 
proc print; 







model ehat= lfcadj cost rev dcof cosd sind d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 
dB d9 dlO dll d12 lehat time yhat2 yhat3; 
jtmean: test lehat=time=yhat2=yhat3=0; 
proc reg; 
model ehat2=lehat2 time yhat2 yhat3; 
jtvar: test lehat2=time=yhat2=yhat3=0; 
proc iml; 
use fcest; 
read all var{intercept lfcadj cost rev dcof cosd sind 
























print out[rowname=outrow colname=outcol]; 
run; 
This is the code for the LIMDEP program to calculate the price level and variance 
models with on information period dummy variable presented in Chapter III. The code 
for the model with separate summary and current information period variables is the 
same except for the lines creating the dummy variables. 
READ;NVAR=13 
;NOBS=2197 
; FILE=A: \VOI96LD. TXT 
;NAMES=WKD, FDLT, PKR, WT, PRC, TYP, BBP, EMPL,TSL, TLSTL, BEPKC, 













;IF (WKD>=41 & WKD<=48 + WKD>=53 & WKD<=60 + WKD>=65 & WKD<=72 + 
WKD>=81 & WKD<=88) DINFO=l; (ELSE)DINFOl=O 
;IF (WKD>=37 & WKD<=42 + WKD>=47 & WKD<=54 + WKD>=62 & WKD<=67 




























This is the code for the LIMDEP program to estimate the lo git model of weight 
deviations presented in Chapter III. Again, this code is for the model with a single 




;NAMES=WKD, FDLT, PKR, WT, PRC, TYP, BBP, FMPL,TSL, TLSTL, BEPKC, 













;IF (WKD>=41 & WKD<=48 + WKD>=53 & WKD<=60 + WKD>=65 & WKD<=72 + 
WKD>=Bl & WKD<=88) DINFO=l; (ELSE)DINFO=O 
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;IF (WKD>=37 & WKD<=42 + WKD>=47 & WKD<=54 + WKD>=62 & WKD<=67 




CREATE;IF (WTVAR=O) WTV=O 
;IF (WTVAR=25) WTV=l 
;IF (WTVAR=50) WTV=2 
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